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ASEAN States, Their Reservations to 
Human Rights Treaties and the Proposed 
ASEAN Commission on Women and 
Children
Suzannah	Linton*
AbSTRACT
This article was inspired by claims made by a number of participants 
at the Fifth Workshop on an ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human 
Rights in Kuala Lumpur (2006) that because all ASEAN states were party 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, they shared common legal 
obligations and so the path was clear for moving forward with the Hanoi 
Action Plan’s Commission on Women and Children. At that time, it was not 
clear that ASEAN would go any further than this commission. This article 
is therefore an examination of the law on reservations, but one that has 
at its core an examination of ASEAN states’ reservations to the six main 
human rights treaties in light of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Analysis is situated in the on-going debate about reservations to human 
rights treaties, as well as assessment of the significance and impact of the 
ASEAN reservations in themselves, in relation to other state parties, on the 
proposed Commission on Women and Children, and on international law 
generally. Since this article was written, ASEAN adopted a new Charter for 
the organization, which, in Article 14, allows for the creation of a human 
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 1. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 Aug. 1967 
in Bangkok by the five original Member Countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 Jan. 1984, Vietnam on 28 
July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. 
Available	at	http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm.
 2. The Cebu Declaration endorsed the Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN 
Charter, Dec. 2006. Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter, 13 Jan. 
2007, available	at http://www.aseansec.org/19257.htm.
 3. The report also recommended including active strengthening of the rule of law including 
international humanitarian law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
as its fundamental principles and objectives in the Charter. Report of the Eminent Per-
sons Group on the ASEAN Charter, Dec. 2006, ¶ 47, available	at http://www.aseansec.
org/19247.pdf. 
 4. See The Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human 
Rights, Bangkok, 29 Mar.–2 Apr. 1993, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.157/ASRM/8, A/CONF.157/
PC/59, 7 Apr. 1993 (hereafter Bangkok Declaration). For Lee Kuan Yew’s arguments about 
Asian Values, see Fareed Zakaria, Culture	is	Destiny:	A	Conversation	with	Lee	Kuan	Yew, 
For. AFF.109 (Mar.–Apr. 1994); see	also MAhAthir MohAMAd & ShintAro iShihArA, the Voice 
oF ASiA: two LeAderS diScuSS the coMing century (Frank Baldwin trans. 1995). Compare 
Amartya Sen, Human	Rights	and	Asian	Values:	What	Lee	Kuan	Yew	and	Le	Peng	Don’t	
Understand	About	Asia, 217 the new repubLic 33 (1997); yASh ghAi, huMAn rightS And 
goVernAnce: the ASiA debAte (ASiA FoundAtion occASionAL pAper no. 4, 1994); Li-ann Thio, 
Implementing	Human	Rights	 in	ASEAN	Countries:	“Promises	 to	keep	and	miles	 to	go	
before	I	sleep,” 2 yALe huM. rtS. & deV. L. J. 1 (1999).
 5. Bangkok Declaration, supra note 4, ¶ 26.
rights body, to operate in accordance with terms of reference yet to be 
decided by the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN. The Commission on Women 
and Children has yet to be established.
I. INTRodUCTIoN
On 13 January 2007, the political leaders of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (hereafter ASEAN)1 met in Cebu in the Philippines and adopted 
a declaration approving the blueprint of a charter for creating a new ASEAN 
Community by 2015.2 The blueprint, prepared by the Eminent Persons Group, 
made a startling (by ASEAN standards) sixteen references to human rights 
and five to international humanitarian law. Further, it expressed support 
for plans to establish an ASEAN Commission on Women and Children and 
encouraged member states to further pursue the “worthy idea” of an ASEAN 
human rights mechanism that “can contribute to ensuring the respect for and 
protection of human rights of every individual in every Member State.”3 
The ASEAN approach subscribes to the notion that there is a body of 
supranational universally binding legal norms that protect the human per-
son from arbitrary encroaches by the state.4 This shift towards human rights 
began with the Bangkok Declaration that reiterated the need to explore 
“the possibilities of establishing regional arrangements for the promotion 
and protection of human rights in Asia.”5 This led to ASEAN states agree-
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 6. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on Hum. Rts., 
48th Sess., 22d plen. mtg., part I, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), reprinted	in 
32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993). 
 7. Joint Communique of the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Singapore, 23–24 
July 1993, available	at	http://www.aseansec.org/2009.htm.
 8. There are interesting parallels to be drawn between ASEAN’s transnational advocacy 
networks, and those that developed in Latin America and caused what is called the 
“justice cascade” punching a hole through impunity for human rights violations pav-
ing the way for the Pinochet litigation. See Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink,	The	 Justice	
Cascade:	The	Evolution	and	Impact	of	Foreign	Human	Rights	Trials	in	Latin	America, 2 
chicAgo J. int’L L. 1 (2001).
 9. These building blocks involve four key activities: promoting human rights action plans, 
supporting establishment of national human rights institutions, fostering human rights 
education, and realizing economic social and cultural rights and the right to develop-
ment.
10. As of 3 May 2004, there had been nineteen such communications to the Human Rights 
Committee since the Philippines acceded to the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 22 Aug. 1989. Statistical survey available	at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/stat2.htm.
ing to the Vienna Declaration in 1993. These states joined other states in 
agreeing that:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. 
The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and 
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cul-
tural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, 
regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and 
protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.6
Shortly after, at the twenty-sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singa-
pore in 1993, the foreign ministers declared themselves to be “in support 
of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of June 25, 1993” and 
“agreed that ASEAN should also consider the establishment of an appropriate 
regional mechanism on human rights.”7 Thereafter, the Joint Communiqué 
began a brief regional effort in human rights at almost every ASEAN Minis-
terial Meeting thereafter. Turning the tide has been possible thanks in part 
to the indefatigable work of civil society (specifically, the Working Group 
for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism)8 who have patiently tuned in to 
the painfully slow step-by-step approach that ASEAN states favor and the 
UN building blocks approach.9 ASEAN states are now party to many human 
rights and humanitarian law conventions, and are subject to the external 
scrutiny of treaty and non-treaty human rights bodies. Even Singapore, Ma-
laysia, and Myanmar report to treaty monitoring bodies. The Philippines is 
the first ASEAN state to allow its citizens the right to directly petition the 
Human Rights Committee, a human rights treaty body.10 Perhaps the Cebu 
Declaration will indeed lead to what the Office of the High Commissioner 
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11. Homayoun Alizadeh, OHCR’s Role in Supporting the Establishment of an ASEAN Regional 
Human Rights Mechanism, paper presented to the Second Asia Human Rights Forum on 
Regional Human Rights Co-operation for Combating Commercial Sexual Exploitation 
of Children in Asia, Seoul, South Korea (5 Feb. 2007) (on file with author).
12. Vitit Muntarbhorn, A Roadmap for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, prepared at 
the third workshop for an ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, Bangkok, 
Thailand, 28–29 May 2003, available	at http://www.fnf.org.ph/liberallibrary/roadmap-
for-asean-human-rights.htm.
13. Vientiane Action Programme (2004–2010), agreed at the 10th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, 
29 Nov. 2004, as the successor to the Hanoi Plan of Action, available	at	http://www.
aseansec.org/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf.
14. See the record of discussion in the Report	of	the	Expert	Meeting	on	the	Establishment	of	
an	ASEAN	Commission	for	the	Promotion	and	Protection	of	the	Rights	of	Women	and	
Children, 20 Nov. 2006, Bangkok, Thailand [hereinafter Report of the Expert Meeting 
on the Establishment of an ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the 
Rights of Women and Children] (on file with author).
15. See Raj Abdul Karim, Efforts to Help Establish a Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Women and Children and Steps to Be Undertaken, paper 
presented to the Fifth Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, 
29–30 June 2006, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This presentation focused solely on surveys 
of existing domestic laws, policies, and institutions regarding the rights of women and 
children (on file with the author).
16. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women [hereinaf-
ter CEDAW], adopted 18 Dec. 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. 
No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980) (entered	into	force 3 Sept. 1981), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 
reprinted	in 19 i.L.M. 33 (1980). There is also an Optional Protocol to the convention 
dealing with communications and greater investigative powers for the monitoring body. 
Within ASEAN, the Philippines and Thailand are parties.
for Human Rights Regional Office in Bangkok considers its “highest prior-
ity”—the establishment of an ASEAN regional human rights mechanism.11
The establishment of an ASEAN commission on the promotion and protec-
tion of the rights of women and children by 2010 was initially proposed in 
the hope that it would serve as a catalyst, or an “entry point,” for a regional 
human rights mechanism.12 If it is to have any teeth, an ASEAN Commission on 
Women and Children must involve some form of multilateral treaty with states 
entering into legally binding obligations. Work has been done on advancing 
this concept since it was adopted in ASEAN’s Vientiane Action Programme 
of 2004.13 The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism has 
been asked to assist ASEAN states in implementation of the human rights 
aspects of the program; at the time of this writing was working on a proposal 
to submit to ASEAN at the Senior Officials Meeting in Manila in 2007. Expert 
consultations at the ASEAN level were held, in Bangkok in November 2006.14 
The concept is being analyzed in consultation with civil society and experts. 
They are identifying relevant domestic legislation, policies, and institutions in 
ASEAN, as well as on the basic conceptual design and mandate. The focus 
is on domestic law in ASEAN states.15
There is an assumption that because all ASEAN states have signed up to 
the two specialized treaties dealing with women and children, respectively the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)16 
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17. Convention on the Rights of the Child [hereinafter CRC], adopted	20 Nov. 1989, G.A. 
Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered	
into	force 2 Sept. 1990), reprinted	in	28 i.L.M. 1448 (1989).
18. Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict, adopted 
25 May 2000, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/49 (2000), (entered into force 12 Feb. 2002).
19. Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child por-
nography, adopted 25 May 2000, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 
49, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000), (entered	into	force 18 Jan. 2002).
20. One can note that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 
comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, has 
adopted Conventions on the Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and 
Children, and on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South 
Asia. Neither is supported by a monitoring mechanism.
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),17 that there is a com-
mon legal standard and there can be no dispute over the jurisdiction ratione 
materiae of a commission. That is not correct. The CRC is now accompanied 
by two protocols, one on children in armed conflict18 and the other on the 
sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography.19 More importantly, 
CEDAW and CRC are among the most heavily reserved of all the human rights 
treaties, with certain ASEAN states, such as Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, 
Thailand, and Malaysia, entering very substantial general reservations. On 
the other hand, there are some ASEAN states that have seen no need to enter 
or maintain reservations, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, and 
Lao PDR. There has been no “common ASEAN position” in this matter. Each 
state has acted in accordance with its own interests and concerns. It bears 
recalling that with human rights being indivisible and inter-linked, women 
and children in ASEAN are also the beneficiaries of rights that some of their 
states have committed to protect under other human rights treaties, such 
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
and under certain international humanitarian law treaties such as the Ge-
neva Conventions of 1949. At least one ASEAN state (Thailand) has become 
tangled in inconsistencies between its different treaty obligations.
This article seeks to make a modest contribution towards the process 
by considering the impact that the international obligations arising from 
treaty participation and reservations by ASEAN states could have upon the 
proposed Commission on Women and Children. The author takes no position 
on the wisdom of separating out women and children as one collectivity, 
as opposed to holding out for a full-blown human rights convention imple-
mented with the assistance of judicial enforcement.20 Neither is a position 
taken on whether there should be two separate commissions each looking 
at a different issue, rather than one that looks at both women and children. 
The complex reservations regime in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
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21. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, (entered	into	force 27 Jan. 1980), reprinted	in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). 
22. Singapore’s reservation to Convention on the Rights of the Child, 5 Oct. 1995, ¶ 3, 
available	at	http://untreaty.un.org/humanrightsconvs/Chapt_IV_11/reservations /singapore.
pdf.
23. Thio, supra note 4, at 28. 
24. See	Philip Alston, Final	Report	on	Enhancing	the	Long-Term	Effectiveness	of	the	United	
Nations	Human	Rights	Treaty	System, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (27 Mar. 1997), argu-
Treaties (Vienna Convention)21 forms the backdrop, with closer consideration 
of the particularly thorny issue of reservations to human rights treaties and 
the ongoing controversies in that area. The discussion will move to the pre-
sentation and analysis of data about the reservations of ASEAN states, by 
focusing narrowly on CEDAW and CRC. This narrow focus is necessitated 
by lengthy restrictions and the need to conduct meaningful analysis of the 
state of ASEAN reservations rather than skimming through them. Some of 
these reservations have been objected to by other states or treaty monitoring 
bodies as invalid for being incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaties. However, these reservations do comprise the terms under which 
ASEAN states are prepared to give their consent to be bound by treaties. What 
then are the treaty obligations of ASEAN states in such circumstances? This 
leads us to the final consideration of the implications of these reservations 
for the proposed Commission on Women and Children. 
II. SETTING THE CoNTExT: WHY do ASEAN STATES bECoME PARTY 
To HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES?
Singapore has made all of its international obligations subject to Singapor-
ean law and the constitution, and made it clear that the “accession to the 
convention by the Republic of Singapore does not imply the acceptance of 
obligations going beyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution of the 
Republic of Singapore nor the acceptance of any obligation to introduce 
any right beyond those prescribed.”22 Brunei and Malaysia have also sub-
jected obligations to Islamic and domestic law. Why do such states then 
bother with joining a treaty if everything is to be maintained at the existing 
standard?
Li-ann Thio has argued that ASEAN participation in human rights treaties 
“displays a degree of good will” on their part, a commitment to international 
rule of law, and “signals to the citizenry that its government is not out of step 
with international mores (insofar as they are reflected by human rights) or 
that it is in fact ‘liberalizing’ and answering the call to accountability.”23 The 
UN driven trend towards universal ratification of the principal human rights 
treaties has been clearly discernable for some years;24 and is now becoming 
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   ing that universal ratification of the six core human rights treaties is the best possible 
foundation for international endeavors to promote respect for human rights.
25. Oona A. Hathaway, Do	Human	Rights	Treaties	Make	a	Difference?, 111 yALe L.J. 1935, 
2020 (2001–2002).
26. Andrew Moravcsik, The	Origins	of	Human	Rights	Regimes:	Democratic	Delegation	in	
Postwar	Europe,	54	int’L org. 217 (2000).
part of the discourse in ASEAN. Some of the states that ratify these treaties, 
such as Myanmar and Laos, face enormous challenges of implementation if 
the pacta	sunt	servanda rule is to be honored. At a minimum, there needs 
to be a legal infrastructure and understanding about the implications of 
treaty participation within the legislature, judiciary, executive, and by the 
ordinary citizen. Take for example, the connected rights to a fair trial and 
due process. They cannot be achieved overnight and are extremely costly. 
Arrest, detention, and investigation procedures need to be aligned with inter-
national standards. The court system must be calibrated to enable trial before 
a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal administering a fair trial 
with due process. These same standards apply to appeals to higher courts. It 
also includes conditions in penitentiaries (should an accused be convicted 
and sentenced to a custodial sentence) and the right to an effective remedy 
if rights have been violated in the process. Such obligations are extremely 
onerous for developing countries. Do states that ratify human rights treaties 
have any intention of meeting their commitments? What motivates states 
to take on such heavy legally binding obligations? Have they genuinely 
embraced the value system that underpins the human rights paradigm, or 
are these just hollow self-interest driven gestures?
International relations theorists offer some possibilities to assist our 
understanding. Sometimes states enter treaties to relieve the pressures from 
other states, from influential supranational political entities, or from their own 
communities. The regional context can be very influential because “regional 
political and economic interdependence generates greater external pressure 
on countries to exhibit a commitment to human rights norms.”25 Basing his 
study on post-war Europe, which also has some resonances in Southeast Asia, 
Professor Andrew Moravcsik has argued that states accept binding human 
rights treaties mainly as a means of political survival; in situations of transi-
tion to liberal or democratic societies, states are most likely to ratify human 
rights instruments to protect the still fragile regime against non-democratic 
opponents.26 They create institutions as a rational and self-interested move to 
selectively delegate sovereignty to a supranational body to secure the desired 
domestic outcome of enhanced democratic governance. Their participation 
in human rights treaties acts to keep the new regime in power and protects 
anti-democratic forces, and solidifies the democratic state; and also locking 
in the policy preference of democracy. 
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27. Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 8, at 5.
28. Heather M. Smith, Explaining Ratification of Global Human Rights Instruments: The 
Role of Regional Instability, prepared for the Journeys in World Politics Conference, 
University of Iowa (9–12 Mar. 2006), available	at	http://www.polisci.uiowa.edu/news/
workshop_papers/smith.pdf.
Ideational theorists argue that states change their behavior because of 
the costs of deviance from the norms of international society, “changing 
models of appropriate and legitimate statehood, and because the political 
pressures of other states and non-state actors affect their understanding of 
their identity and standing in the international community of states.”27 In 
this approach, human rights norms and treaties are particularly important 
because good compliance signals to other states that a state belongs to the 
community of law-abiding, democratic states. 
Another theory, relevant to some ASEAN nations, argues that ratification 
of human rights treaties serves as a signaling device: “States ratify human 
rights treaties after periods of regional crisis as a way to attract aid from the 
major international donors. . . . [P]eriods of intense regional political crisis 
will be followed by waves of ratification of human rights treaties.”28 Signaling 
that they intend to remain democratic or even that they are moving towards 
human rights, it is argued, can result in substantial material benefits from 
the international community (which values indicators such as the strength 
of domestic institutions and human rights policies in receiving countries) 
through development or other assistance. 
III. THE dEbATE oVER RESERVATIoNS—PARTICULARLY 
RESERVATIoNS To HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
A. brief Introduction
The accepted definition of a reservation is codified in Article 2(1)(d) of the 
Vienna Convention: it is a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, 
purporting to exclude or modify the legal effect of a provision(s) of a treaty 
in its/their application to the reserving state. However, it is the content, the 
limitation on the legal obligation that matters. The entering of reservations 
to both procedural and substantive norms of international legal instruments 
is now an accepted, but controversial and confusing, area of international 
law. The debates at the International Law Commission (ILC), the 6th Com-
mittee of the General Assembly, and within the human rights treaty and 
non-treaty bodies and in academia, confirm the contentiousness of the topic. 
Yet it is universally acknowledged that “there is an important and legitimate 
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29. Chairpersons of UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Effective	Implementation	of	Interna-
tional	Instruments	on	Human	Rights,	Including	Reporting	Obligations	Under	International	
Instruments	on	Human	Rights, U.N. Doc. A/47/628, ¶ 60 (10 Nov. 1992). 
30. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 1951 I.C.J 15 (28 May) (hereafter Advisory Opinion on the Genocide 
Convention), available	 at	 http://teaching.law.cornell.edu/faculty/drwcasebook/docs/ 
genocide%20convention%20decision.pdf.
31. Id.	at	12.
32. Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Guerro, Sir Arnold McNair, Read, Hsu Mo, supra	note 
30, at 13–33.
role for reservations to treaties.”29 Reservations enable wider participation 
in treaties by allowing states that would not otherwise be able to ratify. 
The fact that reservations are here to stay is due to the International Court 
of Justice’s landmark Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide 
Convention.30 This decision, tied to the particularities of the convention 
and the context surrounding it, saw a move away from the previous system 
in which reservations were only valid if accepted by every single party to 
a treaty. The Advisory Opinion controversially (7–5 vote) sanctioned the 
entering of reservations to international obligations subject to an objective 
test requiring such limitations to be compatible with the object and purpose 
of the treaty. A “State which has made and maintained a reservation which 
has been objected to by one or more parties to the Convention but not by 
others can be regarded as being a party to the Convention if the reservation 
is compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.”31 Behind this 
lies the need to create a flexible regime that can reconcile competing prin-
ciples and interests—that a state can only be bound with its consent, that 
the unity and integrity of the treaty be preserved, and that there be widest 
participation possible. Whether or not perfect equilibrium is at all possible, 
the establishment and management of an effective and workable balanced 
regime of reservations was, and remains, crucial.
The Advisory Opinion permits reservations as a basic rule in order to 
promote treaty participation (universality), as well as to introduce the re-
quirement of compatibility with the “object and purpose” of the treaty to 
preserve its integrity. An objection to a minor reservation should not result 
in non-ratification. Further, it enabled the other state parties to the treaty to 
use that test to determine if they wish to consider the reserving state a party 
to the treaty. The dissenting judges were highly critical of what they saw as 
the latter’s encroachment onto sovereignty and the fundamental principle of 
state consent.32 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada, and Simma have 
recently underlined in their Joint Separate Opinion in the Armed	Activities	
on	the	Territory	of	the	Congo case that in 1951, the court was responding to 
two question put to it by the General Assembly, at a time when the Genocide 
Convention “stood virtually alone in the sphere of human rights” and it did 
not settle all matters relating to reservations (it “set out the law as to what it 
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33. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Rwanda), I.C.J (3 Feb.2006) (Judgment on Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of 
the Application); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J (3 Feb.); Joint Separate opinion of Judge Higgins, 
Judge Kooijmans, Judge Elaraby, Judge Owada, and Judge Simma, ¶ 13, at 3, available	
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/126/10441.pdf.
34. Of the ten ASEAN states, only five: Cambodia (accession 23 May 1969), Lao PDR (ac-
cession 31 Mar. 1998), Malaysia (accession 27 July 1994), the Philippines (ratification 
15 Nov. 1972) and Vietnam (accession 10 Oct. 2001) are parties. For those non-party 
states, many of Vienna Convention’s provisions are acknowledged as reflecting custom, 
and the reservations provisions, being drawn from the Advisory Opinion on the Genocide 
Convention, are also in that category. See introduction to the internAtionAL biLL oF rightS 
25 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); William A. Schabas, Reservations	to	the	Convention	on	the	
Rights	of	the	Child, 18 huM. rtS. Q. 472, 481 (1996). Even the long-term outsider, the 
United States, has long regarded this convention as “the authoritative guide to current 
treaty law and practice.” S. Exec. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, at 1; reStAteMent 
(third) oF the Foreign reLAtionS LAw oF the united StAteS (1987).
35. Report	 of	 the	 International	 Law	Commission	 on	 the	work	 of	 its	 Forty-Ninth	 Session, 
[1997], 2 y.b. int’L L. coMM. 60 at ¶ 66, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1997/Add.1 (Pt. 2); 
containing the Preliminary Conclusions of the International Law Commission on Reser-
vations to Normative Multilateral Treaties including Human Rights, at ¶ 2	[hereinafter 
ILC Preliminary Conclusions on Reservations].
36. Edward Swaine, Reserving, 31 yALe J. int’L L. 307, 331 (2006).
was asked, and no more; and did not foreclose legal developments in respect 
of hitherto unchartered waters in the future”).33 In time, the majority opinion 
was to play a critical role in coloring the ILC’s work on reservations in the 
law of treaties, culminating in the Vienna Convention, signed in Vienna on 
23 May 1969, and entered into force on 27 January 1980.34 
b. An overview of the Vienna Convention Provisions on Reservations
The Vienna Convention’s reservations regime was designed to apply to all 
treaties,35 although in some situations returning to the pre-Advisory Opinion 
position (for example, Article 20(4) addresses the particular situation of trea-
ties with a limited number of negotiating states—here, reservations are not 
possible). There is a strong presumption in favor of treaty participation over 
integrity. Edward Swaine suggests that all states may benefit from reserva-
tions because they can contribute to the depth of the treaty. Additionally, 
without the possibility of reservations, states would not accept a treaty with 
stringent terms.36 The Vienna Convention covers the formulation of reser-
vations, acceptance, and rejection of them, legal effects, withdrawal, and 
formal requirements. One of the uncertainties, of which there are several, 
is whether they apply to all reservations or just valid ones that pass the 
requirements of Article 19.
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37. See the different definitions proposed by the Special Rapporteur in Reservations	to	Treaties:	
Note	by	the	Special	Rapporteur	on	Draft	Guideline	3.1.5,	Definition	of	the	Object	and	
Purpose	of	the	Treaty, U.N. GAOR, I.L.C., 58th Sess., U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/572, (2006).
38. Advisory Opinion on the Genocide Convention, supra note 30, at 23.
39. ILC Preliminary Conclusions on Reservations, supra note 35, at ¶ 1.
40. The controversy over treaty monitoring bodies will be examined later in this article.
The Vienna Convention awards priority to treaty provisions that deal 
with reservations, with its default position being: in the absence of a specific 
treaty provision, a state may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving 
or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation. In Article 19, the Vienna 
Convention confirms the governing role of treaties and the consent of the 
parties: a treaty can prohibit any reservations, and may lay down specific 
requirements regarding reservations. Where a treaty is silent on reservations, 
then the test of the International Court of Justice re-emerges through Article 
19(c), which provides that a state may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, 
approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation provided that the 
reservation is compatible with the “object and purpose” of the treaty. 
One is automatically drawn to ask what the object and purpose of a treaty 
is. Much has been written about how vague and difficult this is to ascertain. 
It can sometimes be discerned from the preamble. But there is no mechanical 
formulation for identifying object and purpose in the Vienna Convention, 
(although the Special Rapporteur of the ILC is currently working on several 
versions of a definition)37 it has to be discerned on a treaty-by-treaty basis. 
In its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, the 
International Court of Justice recognized that this treaty, as with other hu-
man rights treaties, had its own raison d’être, namely the accomplishment 
of those “high purposes” of the convention that constituted the “common 
interest” of the contracting parties.38 This is about context. The core of the 
treaty, its raison d’être, is the object and purpose of a treaty, which the ILC 
maintains is still the most important of the criteria for determining the ad-
missibility of reservations.39
C. Who decides if a Reservation is Valid or Not?
Apart from a provision providing for a special role for competent organs of 
international organizations in relations to reservations to their constitutive 
instruments under Article 20(3), the calibration of the Vienna Convention 
regime allows for other states parties to object to a reservation. In other words, 
it is up to states parties to a treaty to object to a reservation. There is dispute 
over whether this concerns all reservations or just valid reservations and the 
effect of objecting to an invalid reservation. However, that does not mean 
that treaties cannot confer a power to review reservations on a court or a 
treaty monitoring body.40 For example, under the Genocide Convention, 
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41. Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, (Joint Separate Opinion), supra note 33, ¶ 
28.
42. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), 2002 I.C.J 219 ¶ 72 (July 10) (Request for the Indi-
cation of Provisional Measures).
43. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Judgment on Jurisdiction of the Court 
and Admissibility of the Application), supra note 33, ¶ 67.
44. ILC Preliminary Conclusions on Reservations, supra note 35, ¶ 10.
it is States who are the monitors of each other’s compliance with [sic] prohibi-
tion on genocide. Article IX then gives a State who believes another State is 
committing genocide the chance to come to the Court. Article IX speaks not 
only of disputes over the interpretation and application of the Convention, but 
over the fulfillment of the Convention.41 
It is interesting to note that in the case concerning Armed	Activities	 on	
the	Territory	 of	 the	 Congo,	 the International Court of Justice did not just 
note the Congo’s failure to object to Rwanda’s reservation to the Genocide 
Convention at the appropriate time, but it also took arguments on the issue 
and assessed the compatibility of Rwanda’s reservation. The Court found 
that “it therefore does not appear contrary to the object and purpose of the 
Convention.”42 In its later decision on jurisdiction, the majority turned to 
the issue, finding that:
Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention bears on the 
jurisdiction of the Court, and does not affect substantive obligations relating to 
acts of genocide themselves under that Convention. In the circumstances of 
the present case, the Court cannot conclude that the reservation of Rwanda in 
question, which is meant to exclude a particular method of settling a dispute 
relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the Convention, is to 
be regarded as being incompatible with the object and purpose of the Conven-
tion.43
In the past, objections were crucial as reservations had to be unanimously 
accepted. The need for objections is now less imperative in terms of state 
interests, but states remain the guardians of the treaty. In the “event of inad-
missibility of a reservation, it is the reserving State that has the responsibility 
for taking action.”44 Article 20(1) lays down the basic rule that reservations to 
a treaty that are expressly authorized do not need to be accepted by other 
states unless this is a requirement of the treaty itself. Under Article 20(4), 
a state that enters reservations while expressing consent to be bound may 
only benefit from that reservation if another state accepts it. This creates a 
bilateral, reciprocal relationship. 
The Vienna Convention shifts the balance in favor of the reserving state, 
for unless an objecting state is prepared to declare that there are no treaty 
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45. France-United	Kingdom:	Arbitration	on	 the	Delimitation	of	 the	Continental	 Shelf, 18 
I.L.M. 397, ¶ 61, at 419 (1979).
46. Jan Klabbers, Accepting	the	Unacceptable?	A	New	Nordic	Approach	to	Reservations	to	
Multilateral	Treaties, 69 nordic J. int’L L. 179, 185–86 (2000); Klabbers suggests that the 
Nordic states may be attempting to influence the development of the law on reservations 
at a time when it is under review. Id., at 191. Several examples are to be found in the 
objections to ASEAN state reservations which are mentioned later in this article. 
47. Some treaties provide for a means of determining the validity or invalidity of a reservation. 
E.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
adopted 21 Dec. 1965, 660 U.N.T.S.	195 (entered	 into	 force 4 Jan. 1969), reprinted	
in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966). Under Article 20(2) of this treaty, a reservation will be deemed 
incompatible with its object and purpose if it is objected to by at least two-thirds of 
states parties. Id. However, this is an exception and it has never been used.
48. See	generally Catherine Redgewell, Universality	or	Integrity?	Some	Reflections	on	Reserva-
tions	to	General	Mutlilateral	Treaties,	67 brit. y.b. int’L L. 245 (2004); Jean Kyongun Koh, 
Reservations	to	Multilateral	Treaties:	How	International	Legal	Doctrine	Reflects	World	
Vision, 23 hArV. int’L L. J. 71 (1982); Derek W. Bowett, Reservations	to	Non-Restricted	
Multilateral	Treaties, 48 britiSh y.b. int’L L. 67 (1976–1977); J.M. Ruda, Reservations	to	
Treaties, 146 recueiL deS courS de L’AcAdéMie de droit internAtionAL de LA hAye 95 (1975).
relations or the treaty is not in force between the reserving state and itself, the 
reserving state successfully gets its reservation. It is therefore tilted towards 
treaty participation rather than treaty integrity. Under Article 21(3), in a situ-
ation where a state objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into 
force of the treaty between itself and the reserving state, the provisions to 
which the reservation relates do not apply as between the two states to the 
extent of the reservation. The combined effect of a reservation and objection 
by another state would be to render the article inapplicable as between the 
two countries, but only to the extent of the reservation.45 In other words, the 
reservation is given full effect in spite of the objection. It is rare that a state 
will oppose the entry into force of the treaty altogether but there is a clear 
pattern among some of the Nordic states to “sever” reservations to human 
rights treaties that they feel are incompatible with the object and purpose 
of a treaty.46 Thus, such states argue that the reservation has no legal effect 
and that the treaty applies in its entirety between the two states. But the 
Vienna Convention is silent on severance and the actual effect is unclear 
as reserving states do not respond.
While the standard for determining the validity of a reservation is 
compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty, there is no such 
standard laid down for objections to Article 20. The absence of a standard 
for objections, and of a mechanism to ensure the objective implementation 
of the object and purpose test,47 has caused a doctrinal quarrel with two 
opposing positions:48
1.  “Permissibility:” A reservation that fails the object and purpose test 
is invalid from the start. The restriction in Article 19(c) goes to the 
formulation of a reservation, stating that the formulation of such res-
ervation is permitted only if the reservation is compatible with the 
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49. Second	Report	on	Reservations	to	Treaties	by	Alain	Pellet,	Special	Rapporteur, U.N. GAOR, 
International Law Commission, 48th Sess., ¶ ¶ 241–51, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/477/Add.l 
(1996). 
object and purpose of the treaty. There is therefore no need to object 
to an impermissible reservation; it is only if a reservation is deemed 
“permissible” that one goes to the second tier. A state may then de-
termine whether to accept the reservation or to object to it.
2.  “Opposability:” The validity of a reservation depends on whether 
the other contracting state accepts it. According to this position, the 
object and purpose test of the Vienna Convention is not constitutive, 
but a “mere doctrinal assertion” that only plays an inspirational role 
with no legal effect. States can accept or object to reservations on a 
variety of grounds, such as the object and purpose test or on politi-
cal, self-interested grounds. Thus, even an invalid reservation can be 
accepted by states.
The intentions of states in objecting or not objecting to reservations are 
notoriously difficult to ascertain (see below), and this doctrinal dispute 
remains unresolved. 
d. Consequences of an Invalid Reservation
What are the consequences of an invalid reservation? The answer depends 
on whether one is inclined towards the permissibility or opposability school. 
This is because the Vienna Convention regime (1) does not specify the con-
sequences of formulating an impermissible reservation under Articles 19(a) 
and (b); (2) does not specify the effects of formulation of a reservation that 
is incompatible with the object and purpose; and (3) does not specify how 
Article 19 relates to Article 20 on objections and acceptance of reserva-
tions. For those of the permissibility school, an invalid reservation has no 
legal effect; it is null and void. For the others inclined towards opposability, 
the consequences will depend on how other states respond, i.e., whether 
they accept or object to the reservation. There would be no such problem 
if the states that are party to a treaty expressly provide for an independent 
mechanism with clear authority to assess the validity of reservations and 
make binding findings about the consequences of invalidity. 
Professor Alain  Françoise Pellet takes the view that the only options for 
a state whose reservations are challenged on compatibility grounds are to 
maintain the reservation, withdraw it, replace it, or renounce being a party.49 
Professor Hampson reached the same conclusion in her examination of 
reservations to human rights treaties for the Sub-Commission on Promotion 
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50. Specific	Human	Rights	 Issues,	 Reservations	 to	Human	Rights	Treaties,	 Final	Working	
Paper	 Submitted	 by	 Françoise	Hampson, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 56th 
Sess., Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/42 (2004) [hereinafter Hampson	
Final	Working	Paper]; For earlier reports, see	also Other	Specific	Human	Rights	Issues,	
Reservations	to	Human	Rights	Treaties,	Working	Paper	Preparatory	to	the	Submission	of	
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Sub-Commission	Decision	2002/17, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 54th Sess., 
Agenda Item 6, U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/SUB.2/2002/34 (2002); Expanded	working	paper	
by	Ms.	 Françoise	Hampson	 on	 the	 question	 of	 reservations	 to	 human	 rights	 treaties, 
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SUB.2/2003/WP.2 (2003).
51. See Text of Draft Guidelines on Reservations to Treaties Proposed in The Present Report, 
annexed to the Second Addendum to the Tenth	Report	on	Reservations	 to	Treaties	by	
Mr.	Alain	 Pellet,	 Special	 Rapporteur (hereinafter Text of Draft Guidelines annexed to 
the Second Addendum of Tenth Report by Alain Pellet), U.N. GAOR, I.L.C., 57th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/558/Add.2 (2005).
52. Report	of	the	Meeting	of	the	Working	Group	on	Reservations, International Human rights 
Instruments, Eighteenth Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 
7, Recommendations of the Working Group, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2006/5 (2006). Some 
members of the Human Rights Committee have challenged this, suggesting that instead 
of focusing on intention, the focus should be on the presumption that the reserving 
state would prefer to remain a state party. See Report	of	 the	Meeting	of	 the	Working	
Group	on	Reservations, International Human Rights Instruments, Nineteenth Meeting 
of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2007/5 
(2007).
and Protection of Human Rights.50 The ILC’s Special Rapporteur has pro-
posed a Guideline (3.3.2) providing that “A reservation that does not fulfill 
the conditions for validity laid down in Guideline 3.1 is null and void”; the 
next Guideline (3.3.3) supplements this, providing that acceptance of such a 
reservation by another state party does not change the nullity of the invalid 
reservation.51 This guideline leans towards the permissibility school. For the 
UN Working Group on Reservations, drawn from the human rights treaty 
bodies, the “only foreseeable consequences of invalidity” are:
1. The state could be considered as not being a party to the treaty; or
2. The state could be considered as a party to the treaty but the provi-
sion to which the reservation has been made would not apply; or
3.  The state could be considered as a party to the treaty without the 
benefit of the reservation. 
For this working group, the consequences will depend on the inten-
tion of the state “at the time it enters its reservation. This intention must be 
identified during a serious examination of the available information, with the 
rebuttable presumption that the State would prefer to remain a party to the 
treaty without the benefit of the reservation, rather than being excluded.”52	
This approach draws from Sir Hersch Lauterpacht’s dissenting opinion in 
the Interhandel case, where the learned judge examined the intent of the 
reserving state and the significance of the reservation to its participation in 
the treaty. This led him to find that:
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56. The	Practice	of	Human	Rights	Treaty	Bodies	With	Respect	To	Reservations	to	International	
Human	Rights	Treaties, International Human Rights Instruments, Seventeenth Meeting of 
Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶¶ 37, 38, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2005/5 
28 (2005) [hereinafter Practice	of	Human	Rights	Treaty	Bodies	With	Respect	to	Reserva-
tions	to	International	Human	Rights	Treaties].
If that reservation is an essential condition of the Acceptance in the sense that 
without it the declaring State would have been wholly unwilling to undertake the 
principal obligation, then it is not open to the Court to disregard that reservation 
and at the same time to hold the accepting State bound by the Declaration.53 
The intent of the reserving state was considered by the European Court of 
Human Rights in reaching its decisions in	Belilos and Loizidou, ultimately 
leading to the Court’s severance of the offending reservations entered by 
Switzerland and Turkey.54 The ILC has provisionally adopted a guideline on 
this.55 Pellet has suggested, in discussions with the Human Rights Committee 
and the CERD Committee, that monitoring bodies examining reservations 
should conduct thorough research on the intention of the state party con-
cerned, although this would sometimes be impossible to identify.56 
E. Are Human Rights Treaties an Exception to the Vienna Convention’s 
Reservations Regime?
The Human Rights Committee, watchdog of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, argues that in the context with which it is con-
cerned, the classical rules on reservations are:
[S]o inadequate for the Covenant, States have often not seen any legal interest 
in or need to object to reservations. The absence of protest by States cannot 
imply that a reservation is either compatible or incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the Covenant. Objections have been occasional, made by some 
States but not others, and on grounds not always specified; when an objection 
is made, it often does not specify a legal consequence, or sometimes even 
indicates that the objecting party none the less does not regard the Covenant 
as not in effect as between the parties concerned. In short, the pattern is so 
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not be bound without its consent and some concessions must be made if states are to 
find it in their interest to enter into treaties. Even the Human Rights Committee, in its 
controversial General Comment No.24, General	Comment	on	Issues	Relating	to	Reserva-
tions	Made	upon	Ratification	or	Accession	to	the	Covenant	or	the	Optional	Protocols	
thereto,	or	 in	Relation	 to	Declarations	Under	Article	41	of	 the	Covenant,	 supra note 
57, ¶ 4, could only declare it “desirable in principle that States accept the full range 
of obligations because the human rights norms are the legal expression of the essential 
rights that every person is entitled to as a human being.” 
unclear that it is not safe to assume that a non-objecting State thinks that a 
particular reservation is acceptable. In the view of the Committee, because of 
the special characteristics of the Covenant as a human rights treaty, it is open 
to question what effect objections have between States inter	se. However, an 
objection to a reservation made by States may provide some guidance to the 
Committee in its interpretation as to its compatibility with the object and pur-
pose of the Covenant.57
Human rights treaties are, because of their intrusive nature, the most 
highly reserved category of treaties. State enthusiasm for reserving is widely 
recognized as the price of wide treaty participation, weakening the overall 
effectiveness of the norms which are, by and large, expressed as minimum 
standards.58 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action on Human 
Rights encouraged a restrictive approach to the use of reservations to human 
rights treaties, including precise and narrow formulation and compliance 
with the “object and purpose” rule.59 It must be stressed that there is noth-
ing inherently improper about making reservations to human rights treaties, 
for states cannot be bound without their consent.60 But compatibility with 
the standard that states themselves have accepted in treaty law and custom, 
namely compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty, is the price 
asked for being different. The stakes are high. To allow states to become 
parties to human rights treaties despite their incompatible reservations is to 
dilute the standards of the protection afforded, eroding the essential func-
tions of the treaty. Reservations can also break the unity of a human rights 
treaty when they sever norms that are interconnected.
Beginning his work in the area in 1994, Pellet has found that the reser-
vations regime in the Vienna Convention “generally worked satisfactorily” 
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66. ILC Preliminary Conclusions on Reservations, supra note 35, ¶ 5.
for all treaties notwithstanding “certain ambiguities and uncertainties” and 
so should not be contested.61 The approach, supported by the ILC, is that 
the Vienna Convention regime is drawn from the Advisory Opinion on the 
Genocide Convention and thus sufficient account was taken of the special 
needs of human rights treaties.62 The Special Rapporteur and the ILC, have 
taken the position that there is thus no convincing basis for a special regime 
for reservations to human rights treaties.63 It remains open to states that are 
party to a treaty to include alternative provisions in treaties or to amend 
existing ones.
The experts in the treaty monitoring bodies and the Sub-Commission on 
Human Rights disagree. The controversy is in fact part of the wider debate 
of whether there are now “self-contained regimes” within international law 
and the fragmentation of the discipline.64 To this end, the ILC has specifically 
warned against “the proliferation of specific legal regimes on reservations 
that depended on the nature of the legal instruments in question, since that 
would lead to confusion and the fragmentation of the rules of law.”65
One group argues that there needs to be a special regime for human 
rights treaties, while another challenges any fragmentation of international 
law. Some seek a better balance, pointing to problems with the existing 
regime. Some want universality (i.e. maximum treaty participation). Some 
want the integrity of the treaty preserved. This dispute also draws in the role 
of treaty monitoring bodies vis-à-vis reservations, with the ILC acknowledging 
that in the absence of an express treaty authorization they are “competent 
to comment upon and express recommendations with regard, inter alia, to 
the admissibility of reservations by States, in order to carry out the func-
tions assigned to them.”66 But that is as far as it goes—the ILC’s view is that 
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the “legal force of the findings made by monitoring bodies cannot exceed 
that resulting from the powers given to them for the performance of their 
general monitoring role . . . and in the event of inadmissibility of a reserva-
tion, it is the reserving state that has the responsibility for taking action.”67 
They cannot, for example, sever an invalid reservation from a treaty, unless 
expressly authorized to do so. 
Five judges of the International Court of Justice, including Judge Higgins 
who was a member of the Human Rights Committee from 1984–1995, have 
recently waded into the debate. In their Joint Separate Opinion in the Armed	
Activities	on	 the	Territory	of	 the	Congo case, which exclusively concerns 
reservations, the five judges argued that:
The practice of such bodies is not to be viewed as “making an exception” to the 
law as determined in 1951 by the International Court; we take the view that it 
is rather a development to cover what the Court was never asked at that time, 
and to address new issues that have arisen subsequently.68
In their view, the current practice “is to be regarded as developing the law 
to meet contemporary realities, nothing in the specific findings of the Court 
in 1951 precluding this.”69
The ILC seems to have softened its position somewhat. In a meeting 
with members of the Human Rights Committee on 31 July 2003, the Spe-
cial Rapporteur is reported to have “indicated that the Committee should 
be able to decide on the applicability and validity of reservations, and that 
the “severability” argument could be applied in special circumstances, but 
only if the monitoring body concerned proceeded to a good faith evaluation 
of the true intent of the reserving State.”70 During a meeting with the CERD 
Committee on 4 August 2004, Pellet indicated that the ILC recognized that 
its views may have been too rigid, and would revise the preliminary conclu-
sions, “as they could lead to some practical difficulties in cases where the 
reserving State did not determine the appropriate action to be taken following 
a declaration of invalidity of its reservations, as no mechanism obliged the 
State to take action.”71	Pellet also suggested:
[T]hat an intermediate approach between that of the Human Rights Committee 
and the preliminary conclusions needed to be achieved. In his view, bodies 
adopting binding decisions could have the competence to take a position on 
the severability of reservations from the State’s consent to be bound by the 
Reservations to Treaties & Commission on Women & Children2008 455
72. Id	.
73. See Tenth Report	on	Reservations	to	Treaties	by	Mr.	Alain	Pellet,	Special	Rapporteur, Ad-
dendum;	U.N. GAOR, I.L.C., 57th Sess., ¶ 166, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/558/Add.2 (2005).
74. Id., see Annex, Text of Draft Guidelines on Reservations to Treaties Proposed in the Pres-
ent Report. Note that this contains no reference to the intention of the reserving state.
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sible to identify. 72 
The process of revisiting the Preliminary Conclusions has begun,73 and 
the Special Rapporteur has already proposed a guideline that specifically 
addresses reservations to general human rights treaties:
3.1.12 Reservations to general human rights treaties
To assess the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of a 
general treaty for the protection of human rights, account should be taken of 
the indivisibility of the rights set out therein, the importance that the right which 
is the subject of the reservation has within the basic structure of the treaty, and 
the seriousness of the impact the reservation has upon it.74
Reciprocity describes an aspect of consent. States cannot, by their reserva-
tions, limit another state’s rights. The other must consent to that reservation, 
as it changes the legal relationship between them. Article 21 of the Vienna 
Convention captures this classical notion. It provides that the reservation 
(a) modifies for the reserving state in its relations with that other party the 
provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates; and (b) modifies 
those provisions to the same extent for that other party in its relations with 
the reserving state. Acceptance (implied or express) of a reservation modifies 
treaty relations between the two states, in that the reservation will apply 
in their mutual relations. It is strictly bilateral. So while the accepting state 
can rely on its acceptance of the reservation with respect to the reserving 
state and vice versa, it cannot do so in relation to the other states that are 
party to the same treaty. Those other relations must be determined on a 
bilateral basis. What is most problematic is Article 21(3). If a state objects 
to a reservation but does not deny the entry into force of the treaty, then 
the provisions to which the reservation relates apply to those two states, 
but only to the extent of the reservation. Thus, the reserving state gets what 
it wants and it renders objection meaningless unless the objecting state is 
prepared to have no treaty relations whatsoever. 
This leads us to the next problem—in the human rights system, reciprocal 
relations between one who has entered a reservation and one who has not 
makes no sense. Such treaties are about the assumption of obligations not in 
relation to other states (as per the classical treaty) but towards all individuals 
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75. The	Effect	of	Reservations	on	the	Entry	into	Force	of	the	American	Convention	on	Hu-
man	Rights (arts.74	&	45), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, 1982 inter-AM. ct. h.r. (ser. A) 
No. 2, ¶ 29 (24 Sept.1982).
76. Advisory	 Opinion	 on	 Reservations	 to	 the	 Genocide	 Convention, supra note 30, ¶ 
21– 22.
77. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 239 (1978); Belilos, 132 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 62.
78. The	Effect	of	Reservations	on	the	Entry	into	Force	of	the	American	Convention	on	Hu-
man	Rights (arts.74	&	45), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, 1982 inter-AM. ct. h.r. (ser. A) 
No. 2, ¶ ¶ 28–29 (24 Sept.1982).
79. Temeltasch v. Switzerland, App. No. 9116/80, Eur. Comm’n H.R. 15 (5 May 1982) 
(Report of the Commission).
within their jurisdiction.75 They are not about personal interests of states, but 
treaties that go towards higher values that are encapsulated in the object and 
purpose. That the classic rules derived from a notion of “contracts between 
states” cannot be easily applied in the multilateral context was recognized 
in the foundational Advisory Opinion on the Genocide Convention.76 The 
European Court of Human Rights has also recognized that reciprocity is a 
problematic concept for human rights treaties.77 The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has clearly expressed that while the Vienna Convention:
[R]eflects the needs of traditional multilateral instruments which have as their 
object the reciprocal exchange, for the mutual benefit of the States Parties, of 
bargained for rights and obligations . . . modern human rights treaties in gen-
eral, and the American Convention in particular, are not multilateral treaties of 
the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights 
for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the 
protection of the basic rights of individual human beings.78 
Since their establishment, the human rights treaty bodies have been 
grappling with the issue of reservations. This problem with reservations 
shaped the effectiveness of the treaties with which the monitoring bodies 
were concerned and came on top of their weak enforcement and adjudica-
tory powers. After initial rebuffs from the Office of Legal Affairs to initiatives 
by the CERD and CEDAW Committees, the treaty bodies began reviewing 
reservations as part of the consideration of a state’s report. In the course of 
this, they would question state representatives about the reservations and 
make recommendations for withdrawal. The problems of reservations to 
human rights treaties came to be regularly addressed in General Comments 
and Concluding Observations on State Reports. But, it was soon felt that 
if they are to perform their mandated task of determining the extent of a 
state’s compliance with its treaty obligations, such bodies must go further 
and make determinations on reservations that limit such obligations. The 
European Commission of Human Rights tackled its first reservation in the 
case of Temeltasch79 and the European Court of Human Rights severed 
invalid reservations in Belilos (1987) and Loizidou (1995).
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80. General	Comment	on	Issues	Relating	to	Reservations	Made	upon	Ratification	or	Acces-
sion	to	the	Covenant	or	the	Optional	Protocols	thereto,	or	in	Relation	to	Declarations	
Under	Article	41	of	the	Covenant,	supra	note 57, ¶18.
81. Mr. Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 845/1998, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/74/D/845/1998 (2002).
82. It led to the state’s withdrawal from the Optional Protocol altogether. 
83. Report	of	the	Human	Rights	Committee, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. 
Doc. A/50/40, vol. I, at 127, 131 (1995).
84. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1997, vol. I., Summary Records of the 
Meetings of the Forty-Ninth Session, 12 May–18 July 1997, ¶ 40, at 194.
85. Practice	of	Human	Rights	Treaty	Bodies	With	Respect	To	Reservations	to	International	
Human	Rights	Treaties, supra note 56, ¶ ¶ 25, 28.
The Human Rights Committee has been particularly forthright. In the 
absence of any direct authorization in the ICCPR or from the states con-
cerned, and given the failure of the vast majority of states to exercise their 
right to respond to invalid reservations through objections, the committee 
in General Comment 24 declared itself competent to appraise and make 
a determination on the legal effect of reservations by states party to the 
ICCPR using the familiar object-and-purpose test. It took the position that 
the “normal consequence of an unacceptable reservation is not that the 
Covenant will not be in effect at all for the reserving party. Rather, such a 
reservation will generally be severable, in the sense that the Covenant will 
be operative for the reserving party without benefit of the reservation.”80 
This sees objection as irrelevant, and its espousal of severance goes beyond 
permissibility. The policy reasons are clear and understandable. Functional 
necessity lies behind the need to tackle reservations: how else is the com-
mittee to perform its tasks if it cannot examine and assess reservations? Yet 
no legal grounds were relied on for this remarkable exercise of powers in 
a system in which decisions and recommendations of the Human Rights 
Committee were, and remain to this day, non-binding and unenforceable 
by the will of its creators. The new approach was applied for the first (and 
only) time in Rawle	Kennedy	v.	Trinidad	and	Tobago,81 with the Committee 
severing the offending reservation to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
and proceeding to hear the death-row complaint against the state, contrary 
to its wishes.82 This assumption of power by the Human Rights Committee 
and other treaty monitoring bodies has been highly controversial and directly 
challenged by certain states (the United States and United Kingdom),83 as 
well as the ILC and its Special Rapporteur, who chastised the Committee for 
constituting itself as the “sole judge of the permissibility of reservations.”84 
No other treaty body has gone as far, and there has only been that one in-
stance of severing a reservation. The Committee has instead pursued the less 
confrontational approach of construing the effect of reservations narrowly 
rather than questioning their fundamental permissibility. It also is honoring 
the invocation of reservations and addressing claims directly through the 
use of non-reserved provisions.85
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86. The title change was proposed by the Special Rapportuer and accepted by the members 
of the commission in its 1995 session,	see	the Yearbook of the International Law Com-
mission, Vol. II U.N. Doc, A/CN.4/SER.A/1995/Add.l (Pt. 2), ¶ 434, at 103 (1995).
87. Report of the International Law Commission Fifty-Fifth Session General Assembly Official 
Records, Fifty-Eighth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/58/10), Text	of	the	draft	guidelines	
on	reservations	to	treaties	provisionally	adopted	so	far	by	the	Commission, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.609/Add.2 (2001).
88. See for example, the Report	of	 the	 International	Law	Commission	on	 the	work	of	 its	
Forty-Ninth	Session, supra note 35, ¶ ¶ 92–156; Press Release GA/L/3055, Assembly’s 
Legal Committee is told Law Commission should set up system to judge reservations to 
multilateral treaties, 5 Nov. 1997; Press Release GA/L/3307, Legal Committee hears call 
for meeting of Human Rights Experts on Issue of States Wishing to Enter Reservations 
to Treaties, 31 Oct. 2006.
89. For overview of the practice in the treaty bodies, see the numerous reports emerging 
from Professor Françoise Hampson’s comprehensive study on reservations to human 
rights treaties. Hampson	Final	Working	Paper, supra note 50; Practice	of	Human	Rights	
Treaty	Bodies	With	Respect	To	Reservations	to	International	Human	Rights	Treaties supra 
note 56, at 56.
90. Consideration	of	Reports	Submitted	By	States	Parties	Under	Article	40	of	the	Covenant,	
Concluding	observations	of	 the	Human	Rights	Committee, International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee, 87th Sess., ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (2006). 
91. Practice	of	Human	Rights	Treaty	Bodies	With	Respect	To	Reservations	to	International	
Human	Rights	Treaties, supra note 56, ¶ 12.
F. ongoing Work on Reservations
Since its forty-sixth session in 1994, the ILC has been working on the “law 
and practice relating to reservations to treaties,” which is now re-classified 
as “reservations to treaties.”86 Its original focus was the permissibility ver-
sus opposability doctrinal debate. Having decided that there is no need to 
change the reservations regime, the ILC is now working on draft guidelines 
that are intended to eventually serve as a Guide to Practice for states when 
making reservations to treaties.87 Records of the discussions on the ILC and 
in the sixth Committee of the General Assembly reveal strongly divergent 
positions,88 although the ILC was still able to adopt Preliminary Conclusions 
as early as 1997 at its forty-ninth session.
On the human rights side of the United Nations, the treaty monitoring 
bodies are carrying on as usual.89 The Human Rights Committee continues 
to endorse General Comment 24, although it has not developed its practice 
of severing reservations, and its review of the recent periodic report of the 
United States, suggests a less forceful approach is being employed with 
respect to reservations.90 Its general assertiveness is not followed by commit-
tees such as that on the Rights of the Child, whose concerns are more with 
not detracting from the universality of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.91 Reservations are not of particular significance for the Committees 
against Torture, Economic Social and Cultural Rights, and Migrant Workers. 
But efforts are well underway on harmonizing the work of the treaty bodies 
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92. Report	 of	 the	Meeting	 of	 the	Working	 Group	 on	 Reservations, International Human 
Rights Instruments, Nineteenth Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, ¶ ¶ 12, 16, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2007/5/ (2007); Report	of	the	Meeting	of	the	
Working	Group	on	Reservations, International Human Rights Instruments, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/MC/2007/5 (2007).
93. Harmonized	Guidelines	on	Reporting	Under	 the	International	Human	Rights	Treaties,	
Including	Guidelines	on	a	Common	Core	Document	and	Treaty-Specific	Targeted	Docu-
ments,	Report	of	 the	Secretariat,	 International Human Rights Instruments,	¶ 45, U.N. 
Doc. HRI/MC/2005/3 (2005).
94.	 Hampson Final	Working	Paper, supra note 50, at 19. 
95.	 Hampson Final	Working	Paper, supra note 50, ¶ 71.
96. In a 1998 letter to the ILC, the Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies argued 
that the preliminary conclusions did not accord sufficient attention to the fact that hu-
man rights treaties, by virtue of their subject matter and their role, could not be placed 
on precisely the same footing as other treaties with different characteristics; see	also 
Press Release, Committee On Elimination Of Racial Discrimination Discusses Reserva-
tions By States Parties To Human Rights Treaties (3 Aug. 2004) (on file with the author); 
Hampson	Final	Working	Paper, supra note 50, ¶¶ 63, 64.
and developing a common approach to reservations through an inter-com-
mittee Working Group on Reservations chaired by Sir Nigel Rodley.92 A joint 
General Comment on Reservations is planned. Recommendations have been 
made to the Chairpersons of the human rights bodies, who have already 
issued harmonized guidelines on reporting of reservations, requiring reserv-
ing states to explain the scope of their reservations, the reason why they are 
considered necessary and have been maintained, their precise effect in terms 
of national law and policy, consistency with other treaty obligations, and 
plans to limit or withdraw them.93 These developments follow on from the 
important work done for the United Nations Sub-Commission on Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights by Professor Françoise Hampson, examining 
the actual reservations and interpretative declarations made to human rights 
treaties in light of the legal regime applicable to reservations and interpre-
tative declarations. Human rights treaty bodies “should be encouraged to 
continue their current practice of entering a dialogue with reserving States, 
with a view to effecting such changes in the incompatible reservation as 
to make it compatible with the treaty.”94 In her final report, she found that 
drawing from the normal rules of treaty law and the principle that a judicial 
or quasi-judicial body had the authority to determine whether or not it had 
jurisdiction, the human rights treaty bodies had the competence to determine 
whether or not a reservation was incompatible with the object and purpose 
of the treaty.95 The project is likely to be revived when the ILC and its rap-
porteur examine the validity of reservations and their consequences. 
Despite their differences, the ILC and the United Nations human rights 
bodies are in a dialogue that began with comments by the Chairpersons of 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies on the ILC’s preliminary conclusions.96 Such 
exchanges have been expressly encouraged by the Sixth Committee of 
the General Assembly; the next meeting was planned for May 2007 when 
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97. Press Release, U.N. GAOR, Legal Committee Hears Call for Meeting of Human Rights 
Experts on Issue of States Wishing to Enter Reservations to Treaties (31 Oct. 2006), 
GA/L/3307.
98. Data about ASEAN states and their reservations to CEDAW, CRC and its two protocols, 
and objections thereto, was taken from the United Nations Treaty Collection, available	
at	http://www.bayefsky.com.
99. The Chief of the Treaty Section argues there should be no legal consequences. See 
Summary	 of	 Practice	 of	 the	 Secretary-General	 as	 Depositary	 of	Multilateral	Treaties, 
United Nations Treaty Collection, ¶ 213; Palitha T.B. Kohona, Reservations:	Discussion	
of	Recent	Developments	in	the	Practice	of	the	Secretary-General	of	the	United	Nations	
as	Depositary	of	Multilateral	Treaties, 33 gA J. int’L & coMp. L. 415, 445 (2004–2005). 
the ILC next meets.97 The protracted debate cannot go on for much longer 
in this manner. The Special Rapporteur has been working on the issue of 
reservations since 1994, producing yearly reports of great complexity and 
length, and there have been calls for the matter to be concluded by the 
ILC’s next session.
IV. ASEAN STATES RESERVATIoNS To CEdAW ANd CRC
A. Methodology98
This study includes assessment of all objections against substantive (norma-
tive) reservations filed by parties to a treaty. Within “objections” are included 
not just objections that the Depository has registered as objections, but also 
objections registered by the Depositary as communications for being filed after 
the end of the twelve month period specified in Article 20(5) of the Vienna 
Convention (the UNTS record separates out objections and communications, 
which are dealt with in the Notes section). This approach has been adopted 
because including the communications allows a more complete picture of 
how other states view the ASEAN reservations. They are also included in 
light of the fact that the legal effect of such challenges to the reservation is 
still unresolved (the Depositary’s practice is that it is for states to determine 
the status of such objections99 although they are circulated as communica-
tions) and because many of the objecting states have categorically stated 
their understanding that the twelve month time limit in Article 20(5) does 
not apply to invalid reservations, specifically the ones they are objecting to. 
For example, in relation to Malaysia’s CRC reservations, both Belgium and 
Denmark specifically stated that they made those objections on the under-
standing that the twelve month rule is inapplicable to invalid reservations. 
These states clearly regard their challenges as objections, with legal effect.
There are also a number of conditional statements limiting the state’s 
obligations, but rather than being termed reservations are in fact called 
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100. Belilos, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 49.
101.      (1) The Republic of Singapore considers that a child’s rights as defined in the Convention, in par-
ticular the rights defined in article 12 to 17, shall in accordance with articles 3 and 5 be exercised 
with respect for the authority of parents, schools and other persons who are entrusted with the 
care of the child and in the best interests of the child and in accordance with the customs, values 
and religions of Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious society regarding the place of the child 
within and outside the family. (2) The Republic of Singapore considers that articles 19 and 37 of 
the Convention do not prohibit (a) the application of any prevailing measures prescribed by law 
for maintaining law and order in the Republic of Singapore; (b) measures and restrictions which 
are prescribed by law and which are necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, 
public order, the protection of public health or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; 
or (c) the judicious application of corporal punishment in the best interest of the child. 
   Singapore’s Reservation, supra note 22.
“declarations.” International law is concerned about the content of the 
statement, rather than its label, in determining whether it is a reservation 
or not. Under Article 2(1)(d) of the Vienna Convention, the term reservation 
means a unilateral statement however it is described (i.e. it is the substance 
that counts), made by a state, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving 
or acceding to a treaty and not at a later stage; and whereby it purports 
to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty 
in their application to that state. An interpretative declaration that seeks to 
limit a state party’s obligations under the instrument will be a reservation 
and subject to the rules on regulations in international law.100 Examples of 
this are Singapore’s declarations to CRC, which this article includes as a 
reservation.101 
The assessment of the objections is made in full awareness of their 
weaknesses as a barometer of state practice. States object and fail to object 
for many different reasons, some are principled and others are not. There 
is undeniably a lack of consistency in objections—a state may object to 
one reservation, but not to an identically worded reservation from another 
country. Some states may not have objected because of their belief that they 
need not object to invalid reservations. Others may not have seen it in their 
interests to do so. Some may have wanted to but declined to do so for fear 
of it being seen as an unfriendly act. Yet more may simply not have had time 
or the wherewithal to do so. Some may be driven by political motivations to 
object. There are of course other reasons for objecting to reservations that 
are not provided here. 
This article examines the objections with an awareness of all these factors. 
However, while we cannot presume the intentions of states who do not object, 
and we cannot know if there are ulterior motives for objecting, we do at least 
have those objections which provide much material for analysis. States, as we 
know, do not lightly engage in making objections, which are not the friendliest 
action to undertake in international relations. Therefore, while caution is to be 
exercised, these often well-argued objections warrant careful consideration. 
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102. Belinda Clark,	The	Vienna	 Convention	 Reservations	 Regime	 and	 the	 Convention	 on	
Discrimination	Against	Women, 85 AM J. int’L L. 281, 307 (1991).
103. CEDAW General Recommendation No.4 (6th sess. 1987); CEDAW General Recommen-
dation No.20 (11th sess. 1992); CEDAW General Recommendation No. 21: Equality in 
Marriage and Family Relations (13th sess. 1994); CEDAW General Recommendation No. 
23 (16th sess. 1997).
104. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 4, Id., pmble.
105. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, U.N. 
Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1, Ch. 1, ¶ 6 (1998). 
b. CEdAW
The object and purpose of CEDAW is to promote and achieve the elimina-
tion of all forms of discrimination against women. All ASEAN states are party 
to CEDAW, which has 185 parties. Article 28 permits reservations to be 
made. While there is no formal requirement of acceptance by other states, 
they must not be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Conven-
tion. Belinda Clark points out that the article dealing with reservations in 
CEDAW is not identical to the Vienna Convention, and it is not clear why 
the words “may not be formulated” have been replaced with “shall not be 
permitted.”102 That aside, the setup reflects the flexible regime laid down 
in the Vienna Convention, under which it is ultimately states which decide 
whether a reservation is valid or not. CEDAW is silent on the legal effect 
of reservations, and provides for no mechanism whereby there can be an 
objective determination of whether a reservation is in fact valid. 
The CEDAW Committee has adopted general and specific comments on 
the many reservations that have been entered to this treaty.103 The Committee 
has expressed “concern in relation to the significant number of reservations 
that appeared to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Con-
vention” and suggested “that all States parties concerned reconsider such 
reservations with a view to withdrawing them.”104 In 1998, it adopted a 
statement stressing that Articles 2 and 16 were core provisions of the Con-
vention.105 Article 2 is central to the objects and purposes of the convention 
and sets out the strategies by which discrimination against women is to be 
eliminated. Article 2(f) sets out the obligation to modify and abolish laws, 
regulations, customs and practices discriminating against women. By enter-
ing reservations to that provision, states may effectively exempt themselves 
from responding to both the causes and the manifestations of all forms of 
violence against women. Reservations to Article 2(g) (national penal provi-
sions discriminating against women) permit states to take little or no action 
to amend laws which lead to de	 jure or de	 facto discrimination against 
women. These include laws that criminalize sexual relationships outside 
marriage, or laws that impose restrictions on dress codes or restrictions 
on the freedom of movement. It also includes laws that do not provide for 
adequate or any penalties for violence against women, including rape, and 
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106. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 21, supra note 103, ¶ ¶ 42–44.
the so called “honor killings.” Reservations to Article 16, whether lodged 
for national, traditional, religious or cultural reasons, are incompatible with 
the convention and thus impermissible. In General Comment 21, the Com-
mittee stated that 
Many of these countries [which have entered reservations to Article 16] hold a 
belief in the patriarchal structure of a family which places a father, husband or 
son in a favourable position. In some countries where fundamentalist or other 
extremist views or economic hardships have encouraged a return to old values 
and traditions, women’s place in the family has deteriorated sharply. In others, 
where it has been recognized that a modern society depends for its economic 
advance and for the general good of the community on involving all adults 
equally, regardless of gender, these taboos and reactionary or extremist ideas 
have progressively been discouraged. . . . [T]he Committee requires that all States 
parties gradually progress to a stage where, by its resolute discouragement of 
notions of the inequality of women in the home, each country will withdraw its 
reservation, in particular to articles 9, 15 and 16 of the Convention. States parties 
should resolutely discourage any notions of inequality of women and men which 
are affirmed by laws, or by religious or private law or by custom, and progress to 
the stage where reservations, particularly to article 16, will be withdrawn.106
In light of Article 28(2) and the test of compatibility with the object and 
purpose of the Convention, it referred to the many reservations which rep-
resent a serious problem for the implementation of the Convention and the 
Committee’s ability to monitor compliance with it. 
The CEDAW Committee regularly raises the issue of reservations with 
states in the course of the state reporting process. Very active in tackling 
reservations, this Committee has assumed the authority to consider and 
make findings about reservations being incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the treaty (e.g., in relation to Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and 
Singapore), but it has not severed any reservations which it finds contrary 
to Article 51 of the Convention. 
1.	ASEAN	States’	Reservations	to	CEDAW
There are five ASEAN states that have either not entered reservations to 
CEDAW or have withdrawn all their reservations. These are Cambodia, In-
donesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Myanmar’s only reservation 
relates to Article 29(1) on dispute settlement before the ICJ, a provision to 
which reservations are expressly permitted.
The remaining states—Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand—have entered reservations to six substantive (i.e., normative) provi-
sions, including some which are to provisions that the CEDAW Committee 
considers essential (e.g., Articles 2 and 16).
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107. The Government of Brunei Darussalam expresses its reservations regarding those provisions of the 
said Convention that may be contrary to the Constitution of Brunei Darussalam and to the beliefs 
and principles of Islam, the official religion of Brunei Darussalam and, without prejudice to the 
generality of the said reservations, expresses its reservations regarding paragraph 2 of Article 9 and 
paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the Convention.
   Reservation to CEDAW, Brunei Darussalam,	available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/ratification/8.htm.
108. The original reservations read as follows: 
The Government of Malaysia declares that Malaysia's accession is subject to the understanding 
that the provisions of the Convention do not conflict with the provisions of the Islamic Sharia' 
law and the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. With regards thereto, further, the Government of 
Malaysia does not consider itself bound by the provisions of articles 2 (f), 5 (a), 7 (b), 9 and 16 
of the aforesaid Convention. In relation to article 11, Malaysia interprets the provisions of this 
article as a reference to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of equality between men 
and women only. 
On 6 February 1998, the Government of Malaysia notified the Secretary-General of a partial	
withdrawal as follows: 
1. ... 2. With respect to article 5 (a) of the Convention, the Government of Malaysia declares that 
the provision is subject to the Syariah law on the division of inherited property. 
 3. With respect to article 7 (b) of the Convention, the Government of Malaysia declares that the 
application of said article 7 (b) shall not affect appointment to certain public offices like the Mufti 
Syariah Court Judges, and the Imam which is in accordance with the provisions of the Islamic 
Shariah law. 
 4. With respect to article 9, paragraph2 of the Convention, the Government of Malaysia declares 
that its reservation will be reviewed if the Government amends the relevant law.
 5. With respect to article 16.1 (a) and paragraph 2, the Government of Malaysia declares that 
under the Syariah law and the laws of Malaysia the age limit for marriage for women is sixteen 
and men is eighteen.
 The Government of Malaysia withdraws its reservation in respect of article 2(f), 9(1), 16(b), 16(d), 
16(e) and 16(h).”
   Reservation to CEDAW, Malaysia, available	 at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
ratification/8.htm.
PRoVISIoN RESERVING STATE
Article 2—Policy Measures Singapore
Article 5(a)—Role Stereotyping and Prejudice Malaysia
Article 7(b)—Political and Public Life Malaysia
Article 9(2)—Nationality Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore
Article 11—Employment Malaysia, Singapore
Article 16—Marriage and Family Life Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia (Arts. 16(1)(a),   
 (c), (e), (f), (g) and 16(2)).
In addition to these article-specific reservations, these ASEAN states have 
also made reservations of a general nature, with potential impact on all 
provisions of the treaty.
RESERVING STATE RESERVATIoN CATEGoRY
Brunei Darussalam Constitution, Islam107
Malaysia Shariah, Constitution108
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109.  (1) In the context of Singapore ‘s multi-racial and multi-religious society and the need to respect 
the freedom of minorities to practise their religious and personal laws, the Republic of Singapore 
reserves the right not to apply the provisions of articles 2 and 16 where compliance with these 
provisions would be contrary to their religious or personal laws. (2) Singapore is geographically 
one of the smallest independent countries in the world and one of the most densely populated. The 
Republic of Singapore accordingly reserves the right to apply such laws and conditions governing 
the entry into, stay in, employment of and departure from its territory of those who do not have 
the right under the laws of Singapore to enter and remain indefinitely in Singapore and to the 
conferment, acquisitions and loss of citizenship of women who have acquired such citizenship by 
marriage and of children born outside Singapore. (3) Singapore interprets article 11, paragraph 1 
in the light of the provisions of article 4, paragraph 2 as not precluding prohibitions, restrictions 
or conditions on the employment of women in certain areas, or on work done by them where 
this is considered necessary or desirable to protect the health and safety of women or the human 
foetus, including such prohibitions, restrictions or conditions imposed in consequence of other 
international obligations of Singapore and considers that legislation in respect of article 11 is un-
necessary for the minority of women who do not fall within the ambit of Singapore’s employment 
legislation. (4) The Republic of Singapore declares, in pursuance of article 29, paragraph 2 of the 
Convention that it will not be bound by the provisions of article 29, paragraph 1.
   Reservation to CEDAW, Singapore, available	at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
ratification/8_1.htm.
110.  1. In all matters which concern national security, maintenance of public order and service or em-
ployment in the military or paramilitary forces, the Royal Thai Government reserves its right to apply 
the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of discrimination against Women, 
in particular articles 7 and 10 , only within the limits established by national laws regulations and 
practices. 2. With regard to article 9, paragraph 2, [ . . . ] the Royal Thai Government considers 
that the application of the said provisions shall be subject to the limits and criteria established 
by national law, regulations and practices. 3. The Royal Thai Government does not consider itself 
bound by the provisions of [ . . . ] article 16 and article 29, paragraph 1, of the Convention.
    On 25 January 1991, the Government of Thailand notified the Secretary-General of its decision 
to withdraw the reservations made upon accession to the extent that they apply to Article 11, 
¶ 1 (b), Article 15, ¶ 3. Subsequently, on 26 October 1992, the government of Thailand notified 
the Secretary-General of its decision to withdraw one of the reservations made upon accession to 
the Convention, i.e., that relating to Article 9 (2), which reservation reads as follows: 
    2. With regard to article 9, paragraph 2, [ . . . ] the Royal Thai Government considers that the 
application of the said provisions shall be subject to the limits and criteria established by national 
law, regulations and practices." Subsequently, on 1 August 1996, the Government of Thailand 
notified the Secretary-General of its decision to withdraw, as from that same date, the following 
reservation, made upon accession: "
    1. In all matters which concern national security, maintenance of public order and service or 
employment in the military or para military forces, the Royal Thai Government reserves its right to 
apply the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, in particular articles 7 and 10, only within the limits established by national laws, regula-
tions and practices.
   Reservations to CEDAW, Thailand, available	 at	 http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
treaty9_asp.htm, see	also note 50.
Singapore Private/religious/personal laws, socio-political   
 conditions, national legislation109
Thailand Constitution, national laws110
The effect of these catch-all reservations is to allow each of these states a 
fall-back whenever they do not wish to comply with a CEDAW obligation 
to amend laws or practices that are incompatible.
2.	Objections	by	other	States
The objections to reservations entered to CEDAW by the ASEAN states have 
been made by Europe, and Mexico. 
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111. This objection relates to the partial withdrawal and modifications made by Malaysia on 
6 Feb. 1998. 
RESERVING STATE     obJECTING STATE               bASIS oF obJECTIoN
Brunei Darussalam Austria Vagueness or imprecision
  Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
 Denmark Vagueness or imprecision
  Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
 Estonia Vagueness or imprecision
  Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
 Germany Vagueness or imprecision
  Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
 Ireland Vagueness or imprecision
  Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
 Latvia Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
Malaysia Finland Vagueness or imprecision
  Invocation of domestic law
  Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
 Germany Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
 Netherlands Invocation of domestic law
  Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
 Norway Invocation of domestic law
  Invocation of religious law
  Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
 Denmark Invocation of internal law
  Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty (Reservations to   
  Articles 2(f), 5(a), 9 and 16)
 France111 Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
Singapore Finland Vagueness or imprecision
  Too wide
  Invocation of domestic law
  Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
 Netherlands Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty (1st reservation)
  Invocation of domestic law (2nd   
  reservation)
 Norway Invocation of domestic law
 Denmark Invocation of domestic law
  Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
 Sweden Vagueness or imprecision
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112. Denmark’s comments with regard to the reservations made by Brunei Darussalam upon 
accession to CEDAW, (6 OCT. 2006), available	at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bod-
ies/ratification/8_1.htm 
Thailand Germany Too wide
  Incompatible with object and purpose
 Sweden Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
 Mexico Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
 Netherlands Incompatible with the object and   
  purpose of the treaty
Every one of the six states objecting to Brunei Darussalam’s reserva-
tions did so on the grounds that they were incompatible with the object 
and purpose of CEDAW. Germany pointed out that the general reservation 
left the extent of Brunei’s obligations unclear and as such it was incompat-
ible with the object and purpose of the treaty, and the specific reservation 
to Article 9(2) would discriminate against women, which would also be 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. Denmark pointed 
out that the reservation to Article 9(2) would discriminate against women, 
and thus was contrary to the object and purpose of CEDAW, and “accord-
ingly inadmissible and without effect under international law.”112 It called on 
Brunei Darussalam to reconsider its reservations. Estonia objected to Article 
9(2) and the general reservation as being incompatible with the object and 
purpose. Ireland was more nuanced about the general reservation casting 
doubts on Brunei Darussalam’s commitment, but was clear that the Article 
9(2) reservation was incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. 
Austria also had doubts about the commitment of Brunei Darussalam to its 
treaty obligations, and pointed out that states are expected to be prepared 
to undertake legislative changes to meet their treaty obligations. Only Lat-
via, which pointed out that the distinction between genders in relation to 
nationality of children was contrary to equality between men and women, 
and thus contrary to the object and purpose of CEDAW, severed the reserva-
tions. For the rest the treaty applied subject to the reservation.
Each of the six states objecting to Malaysia’s reservations found them to 
be contrary to the object and purpose of CEDAW. Finland declared that the 
reservations to Articles 2(f) and 5(a) concerned two fundamental provisions 
of the Convention the implementation of which is essential to fulfilling its 
object and purpose. Denmark declared that the reservations covered central 
provisions of the treaty. Both these states severed the reservations—Finland 
finding them to be devoid of legal effect, and Denmark declared them 
without effect under international law. No state opposed the treaty’s entry 
into force between itself and Malaysia. 
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113. In its Advisory	Opinion	on	Reservations	 to	 the	Genocide	Convention, supra note 30, 
the majority did point out that states may object to reservations without claiming they 
are incompatible with its object and purpose; in such cases the treaty remains in force 
between the reserving and objecting States without the clauses affected by the reserva-
tion. Id., at 27.
114. Sweden’s comment on Thailand’s reservations to CEDAW, (17 Mar. 1986), available	at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/8_1.htm 
115. Combined	 Initial	 and	Second	Periodic	Reports	of	 States	Parties:	Malaysia, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2 (12 Apr. 2004). The précis of the discussions between the state and 
the Committee are drawn from Malaysia	Needs	New	Laws	Aimed	Specifically	at	Ending	
Discrimination	on	Basis	of	Sex,	Gender,	Say	Committee’s	Expert	Members, U.N. Doc.
WOM/1562 (24 May 2006).
Of the five states that objected to Singapore’s reservations, three were 
clear that they were incompatible with the object and purpose of CEDAW, 
and two used softer language about how the reservations “may create doubts” 
or “creates doubts” about Singapore’s commitment to the object and purpose 
of the convention.113 Finland declared that the reservations to Articles 2(f) and 
5(a) concerned two fundamental provisions of the Convention, the imple-
mentation of which is essential to fulfilling its object and purpose. Denmark 
pointed out the reservations covered central provisions of the Convention. 
These two states, along with Sweden, severed the reservations. No state op-
posed the treaty’s entry into force between itself and Singapore. 
Every one of the four states who objected to Thailand’s reservation found 
it to be contrary to the object and purpose of CEDAW. Sweden took the 
position that the reservations: 
[I]f put into practice, would inevitably result in discrimination against women 
on the basis of sex, which is contrary to everything the Convention stands for. 
It should also be borne in mind that the principles of the equal rights of men 
and women and of non-discrimination on the basis of sex are set forth in the 
Charter of the United Nations as one of its purposes, in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights of 1948 and in various multilateral instruments, to which 
Thailand [is a party].114
Mexico pointed out that Thailand had accepted the non-discrimination provi-
sions in the ICCPR, ICESCR, and also the UDHR, and that it was inconsistent 
with its contractual obligations to claim reservations on these matters in 
CEDAW. None of the objecting states severed the reservation; none of them 
opposed the treaty’s entry into force between themselves and Thailand. None 
of the reserving states responded to the objections.
3.	ASEAN	States:	Their	reservations	and	the	CEDAW	Committee	
Malaysia’s combined initial and second periodic report was examined by the 
CEDAW Committee on 24 May 2006.115 The report noted that Malaysia had 
ratified the convention with a number of reservations because some articles 
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116. Concluding	Comments	on	the	Elimination	of	Discrimination	against	Women:	Malaysia, 
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, ¶ 10 (31 May 2006).
117. Initial	Report	of	States	Parties:	Singapore, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SGP/1 (18 Jan. 2000); 
Second	Periodic	Report	of	States	Parties:	Singapore, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/ C/SGP/2 (3 May 
2001). The Committee considered the reports at its 514th,515th, and 522nd meetings, on 
9 and 13 July 2001. The précis of discussions between the state and the Committee is 
drawn from the record of proceedings in Singapore	Delegates,	Describing	Compliance	
With	Women’s	Convention,	 Say	Account	Must	Be	Taken	Of	Cultural	Tradition,	Need	
for	Stability:	Committee	Chairperson	Says	Concern	Remains	Over	‘Reservations’	Which	
Contradict	Letter	and	Spirit	of	International	Agreement, U.N. Doc. WOM/1293 (13 Jul. 
2001).
were deemed contradictory to the county’s laws. Malaysia explained that an 
Inter-Ministry Committee had been set up to review reservations to Article 
5(a) and 7(b) and the consultations with different governmental departments 
and agencies was underway. It explained that it was considering withdraw-
ing the reservations to these two provisions, but not the others. Committee 
member Ms. Schopp-Schilling specifically urged Malaysia to withdraw its 
reservation to Article 16 on marriage and family life without delay. Malaysia 
explained that in relation to the Article 7(b) reservation, some posts in the 
Shariah court could not be held by women as these were religious offices 
involving leading people in prayer, which according to Islamic rules women 
were not always allowed to do. Committee member Ms. Belmihoub-Zerdani 
took issue with the reservation to Article 9(2), saying it was the most flagrant 
example of discrimination to prohibit a woman married to a foreigner from 
transferring her nationality to her own children, even when there were no 
religious obstacles to doing so under Muslim law. Malaysia also explained 
that family laws were so entrenched in Malaysia that the belief was that 
Shariah law actually offered women greater protections than non-Islamic 
law. The issue was not that Malaysia had taken a step back but that there 
were certain ambiguities, which was why the government had undertaken a 
review. In its concluding observations on 31 May 2006, the CEDAW Com-
mittee commended Malaysia for withdrawing reservations and considering 
withdrawal of reservations to Articles 5(a) and 7(b) but expressed concern at 
its unwillingness to withdraw the rest. It was particularly concerned at the 
state’s position that laws based on Shariah interpretation cannot be reformed. 
Malaysia was urged to “review all its remaining reservations with a view 
to withdrawing them, and especially reservations to Article 16, which are 
contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.”116 
Singapore’s initial and second periodic reports to the CEDAW Committee 
were considered on 9 July 2001.117 In this meeting, the state was pressed 
about its reservations. It responded that Singaporean society was dynamic 
and existed in an international context, as did its laws and policies. Singapore 
had to be mindful that its laws reflect its economic, social, and geo-political 
situation, its constraints and realities, as well as the kind of society Singa-
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118. Report	of	the	Committee	on	the	Elimination	of	Discrimination	against	Women (24th and 
25th Sess. 2001), U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No.38, ¶ ¶ 73, 74, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 
(2001).
poreans wanted for themselves and their children. Singapore was serious 
about advancing the de facto status of its women and their equality with 
men, and it was in that spirit that it had ratified the Convention. It also had 
to be sensitive to the different cultural and religious beliefs of its people, as 
they were the foundation of the country’s social and political stability. It was 
committed to the advancement of the status of women and to ensuring that 
the objectives of the Convention were upheld and advanced. While it may 
not be possible to fully comply with the obligations under the Convention, it 
had been Singapore’s choice to accede to the Convention, as it believed its 
reservations would allow it to do so. The state’s position was that reservations 
to Articles 2 and 16 were necessary, because the Constitution of Singapore 
required respect for cultural and national peculiarities of various groups of 
society. It was important to maintain the delicate balance in Singapore’s 
multicultural society. There were provisions in the Administration of Muslim 
Law Act, which may not be consistent with the Convention (for instance, the 
right of a Muslim to marry up to four wives). Singapore had considered the 
views of Islamic authorities when making the reservations. On the Article 
9 reservations, it was stressed that Singapore was not the only country that 
adopted laws to govern employment, stay, and departure of people to its ter-
ritory. Such requirements were dependent upon each country’s unique needs 
and were gender-neutral. The reservation to Article 9 was also required in 
light of Singapore’s Constitution, which allowed for citizenship by descent 
on the children born overseas of a Singaporean father. There were no similar 
provisions regarding the children born from Singaporean mothers abroad. 
The matter would continue to be discussed in the Parliament, in view of 
the changing social values and realities. The reservations to Article 11 were 
necessary in order to safeguard the welfare of women and their unborn 
children from certain hazardous occupations and in line with the reference 
to the obligations of state parties to safeguard the functions of reproduction. 
That was necessary in light of the country’s small population and low fertil-
ity rate. For that reason, for example, women were excluded from certain 
hazardous occupations in the military to avoid deploying them in combat 
roles in time of hostility. In its Concluding Observations, the CEDAW Com-
mittee expressed “deep concern regarding the reservations made by the 
government of Singapore to Articles 2, 9, 11, paragraph 1, and 16 of the 
Convention. . . . [A]rticles 2 and 16 are the very essence of obligations under 
the Convention.”118 It urged Singapore to continue the process of reform of 
Muslim personal law in consultation with members of different ethnic and 
religious groups, including women.
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119. The	précis	of discussions between the state and the Committee is drawn from the record 
of proceedings in Committee	Monitoring	Compliance	with	Women’s	Anti-Discrimina-
tion	Convention	Takes	Up	Periodic	Report	of	Thailand, U.N. Doc WOM/1531 (20 Jan. 
2006). 
120. Id. ¶ 4.
121. Concluding	Comments	of	the	Committee	on	the	Elimination	of	Discrimination	against	
Women:	Thailand, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/THA/CO/5, ¶ 11 (3 Feb. 2006).
Thailand’s first report was considered in 1990, and by the time its fourth 
and fifth periodic reports were jointly examined on 20 January 2006, had 
only two out of its original seven reservations remaining (Articles 16 and 
29(1)).119 In its 1999 discussions with the Committee, Thailand explained 
the social resistance to Article 16 on the elimination of discrimination in 
marriage and family life. The state explained that Thai men had strongly 
opposed attempts made by the National Commission on Women’s Affairs 
to amend laws to facilitate the withdrawal of the reservation to Article 16. 
Its proposals had been rejected by the Council of State. In its most recent 
report, Thailand stated that despite the removal of the reservation to Article 
16(g) (rights in marriage, for example to choose the family name, profes-
sion, and occupation) in 2003, there were still a number of provisions in 
its family law that could be seen as discriminatory under CEDAW. This was 
being discussed. The government was “doing its utmost to bring the country’s 
Family Law in line with Article 16 of the Convention, while ensuring that 
the adopted measures did not undermine the richness of Thailand’s cultures 
and traditions.”120 In replying to further questions on reservations, the del-
egation assured the committee that efforts were underway to persuade the 
government to withdraw its reservation to all points under marriage and 
family, but there were sticking points on divorce and compensation in the 
breach of an engagement contract. Committee Expert Dubravka Simonovic 
was critical saying it was her impression that the Convention was perceived 
as a Declaration rather than as a binding agreement. The state assured the 
Committee that it respected the binding nature of CEDAW, but individuals 
might not perceive it that way. In its Concluding Observations, the CEDAW 
Committee underlined its concern “that the State party continues to retain 
its reservation to Article 16 of the Convention. The Committee draws the 
attention of the State party to the fact that reservations to Article 16 [of the 
convention] are contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.” 121
C. CRC
The object and purpose of the CRC can be seen as the protection of the 
fundamental rights of the child as set out in that convention. All ASEAN states 
are now party to the CRC, which has 193 parties in total. This convention 
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122. CRC, supra note 17, art. 51.
123. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 6, Pt. II, ¶ 5.
124. The Practice of Human Rights Treaty Bodies With Respect to Reservations to International 
Human Rights Treaties, Seventeenth meeting of chairpersons of the human right treaty 
bodies, Geneva, 23–24 June 2005; Fourth Inter-Committee Meeting of the human rights 
treaty bodies, 20–22 June 2005, U.N.Doc. HRI/MC/2005/5, 13 June 2005.
125. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 6, Pt. II, ¶ 5.
126. General	Guidelines	for	Periodic	Reports,	U.N. Doc. CRC/C/58, ¶ 11 (20 Nov. 1996).
127. Schabas, supra note 34, at 488.
128. Practice	of	Human	Rights	Treaty	Bodies	With	Respect	To	Reservations	to	International	
Human	Rights	Treaties, supra note 56, ¶ 12.
permits reservations in Article 51, providing that reservations “incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permit-
ted.”122 The CRC is silent on the legal effect of reservations, and provides for 
no mechanism whereby there can be objective determination of whether a 
reservation is in fact valid. 
The extent of reservations to this treaty led to the call, in the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action emerging from the World Conference 
on Human Rights, to states parties to withdraw those reservations that were 
contrary to its object and purpose.123 The Committee on the Rights of the 
Child has been engaged on the issue of reservations since its very first meet-
ing.124 It has addressed reservations in several general comments. General 
Comment No. 5 (2003) on general measures of implementation expressed 
deep concern that some states had made reservations that plainly breached 
Article 51 (2) by suggesting, for example, that respect for the Convention is 
limited by the state’s existing constitution or legislation, including in some 
cases religious law. It points out that Article 27 of the Vienna Convention 
provides that a party cannot invoke its internal law as justification for failure 
to perform a treaty and encourages other states to lodge formal objections to 
such wide-ranging reservations. In its general guidelines regarding periodic 
reports, the World Conference on Human Rights asked states to consider 
reviewing any reservation with a view to withdrawing it,125 and to “indicate 
whether the Government consider[ed] it necessary to maintain the reserva-
tions it ha[d] made, if any, or ha[d] the intention of withdrawing them.”126 In 
its guidelines for initial reports under the Optional Protocols, the Committee 
requested information about the intention of states parties to withdraw any 
existing reservations. 
This Committee has not been very robust in tackling reservations. Writing 
in 1996, William Schabas described its approach as “cautious.”127 It is more 
focused on maximum treaty participation: as early as 1992, it identified as 
its primary consideration the maintenance of the “spirit of understanding and 
consensus deriving from the Convention, and stressed that it did not wish 
to refer to the question of reservations and declarations as a dividing factor 
which would undermine this spirit.”128 While it has assumed the authority to 
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consider and rule on reservations, it does not do so directly, as will be seen. 
It has not severed any such reservations which it finds contrary to Article 
51 of the CRC. It prefers to root any objections in the Vienna Programme 
of Action and even NGO consultations in the country (see its Concluding 
Observations on Malaysia).
1.	ASEAN	States’	Reservations	to	CRC
There are six ASEAN states that have entered, or retain, no reservations 
limiting their obligations under the CRC (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, Philippines, and Vietnam). The remainder have entered reserva-
tions to twenty normative articles in Part I of the convention as well as 
reservations of a general character that apply across the board and are not 
tied to particular provisions. 
PRoVISIoN                                                          RESERVING STATE
Article 1—Definition of Child Malaysia
Article 2—Non Discrimination Malaysia
Article 3—General principles Singapore
Article 4—Measures to be taken Singapore
Article 5—Parental and other rights Singapore
Article 7—Right to a Name and Nationality Malaysia
Article 9—Right to Parental Access and Family Life Thailand
Article 10—Family reunification Singapore
Article 13—Freedom of Expression Malaysia
Article 14—Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion Brunei, Malaysia
Article 15—Freedom of Assembly and Association Malaysia
Article 16—Right to Privacy Singapore
Article 17—Right to information Singapore
Article 18—Parental rights Singapore
Article 20—Right to Special Protection and Assistance Brunei
Article 21—Adoption Brunei
Article 22—Rights of Refugee Children Thailand
Article 28—Right to Education Singapore, Malaysia
Article 32—Protection from Economic Exploitation Singapore
Article 37—Freedom from Torture and Deprivation of Liberty Singapore
Three of the four ASEAN states have made reservations of a general 
cross-cutting nature, with potential impact on all provisions in the treaty.
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129.  [The Government of Brunei Darussalam] expresses its reservations on the provisions of the said 
Convention which may be contrary to the Constitution of Brunei Darussalam and to the beliefs 
and principles of Islam, the State, religion, and without prejudice to the generality of the said 
reservations, in particular expresses its reservation on articles 14, 20 and 21 of the Convention.
130.  The Government of Malaysia accepts the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
but expresses reservations with respect to articles 1, 2, 7, 13, 14, 15, [ . . . ], 28, [paragraph 1 (a)] 
37, [ . . . ] of the Convention and declares that the said provisions shall be applicable only if they 
are in conformity with the Constitution, national laws and national policies of the Government of 
Malaysia.
131. 	Declarations: (1) The Republic of Singapore considers that a child’s rights as defined in the Conven-
tion, in particular the rights defined in article 12 to 17, shall in accordance with articles 3 and 5 
be exercised with respect for the authority of parents, schools and other persons who are entrusted 
with the care of the child and in the best interests of the child and in accordance with the customs, 
values and religions of Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious society regarding the place of 
the child within and outside the family. (2) The Republic of Singapore considers that articles 19 
and 37 of the Convention do not prohibit (a) the application of any prevailing measures prescribed 
by law for maintaining law and order in the Republic of Singapore; (b) measures and restrictions 
which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in the interests of national security, public 
safety, public order, the protection of public health or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others; or (c) the judicious application of corporal punishment in the best interest of the child.
    Reservations: (3) The Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Singapore provide adequate 
protection and fundamental rights and liberties in the best interests of the child. The accession to 
the Convention by the Republic of Singapore does not imply the acceptance of obligations going 
beyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore nor the acceptance 
of any obligation to introduce any right beyond those prescribed under the Constitution. (4) Sin-
gapore is geographically one of the smallest independent countries in the world and one of the 
most densely populated. The Republic of Singapore accordingly reserves the right to apply such 
legislation and conditions concerning the entry into, stay in and departure from the Republic of 
Singapore of those who do not or who no longer have the right under the laws of the Republic 
of Singapore, to enter and remain in the Republic of Singapore, and to the acquisition and pos-
session of citizenship, as it may deem necessary from time to time and in accordance with the 
laws of the Republic of Singapore. (5) The employment legislation of the Republic of Singapore 
prohibits the employment of children below 12 years old and gives special protection to working 
children between the ages of 12 years and below the age of 16 years. The Republic of Singapore 
reserves the right to apply article 32 subject to such employment legislation. (6) With respect to 
article 28.1(a), the Republic of Singapore- (a) does not consider itself bound by the requirement to 
make primary education compulsory because such a measure is unnecessary in our social context 
where in practice virtually all children attend primary school; and (b) reserves the right to provide 
primary education free only to children who are citizens of Singapore.
RESERVING STATE                        RESERVATIoN CATEGoRY
Brunei Darussalam Constitution, Islam, State, Religion129
Malaysia Constitution, National Laws, National Policies130
Singapore Existing Socio-Political Situation, Domestic Law, State131
The effect of these catch-all reservations is to allow each of these states 
a fall-back whenever they do not wish to comply with a CRC obligation to 
amend laws or practices that are incompatible.
2.	Objections	by	Other	States
The objections to reservations entered to the CRC by ASEAN states have 
drawn objection exclusively from European states. 
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RESERVING STATE     obJECTING STATE     bASIS oF obJECTIoN
Brunei Darussalam Finland Vagueness or Imprecision 
  Invocation of Domestic Law 
 Sweden Vagueness or Imprecision
  Invocation of Domestic Law
 Ireland Incompatible with the Object and Purpose of   
  the Treaty
 Denmark Incompatible with the Object and Purpose of   
  the Treaty
  Invocation of Domestic Law
 Germany Invocation of Domestic Law
 Norway Too Wide
 Italy Invocation of Domestic Law
 Portugal Invocation of Domestic Law
 Austria Incompatible with the Object and Purpose of   
  the Treaty unless Reserving State Provides   
  More Details
 Netherlands Invocation of Domestic Law
Malaysia Belgium Incompatible with the Object and Purpose of   
  the Treaty
 Denmark Too Wide
  Invocation of Domestic Law
  Incompatible with the Object and Purpose of   
  the Treaty
 Austria Incompatible with the Object and Purpose of   
  the Treaty unless Reserving State Provides More 
  Details
 Norway Too Wide 
  Vagueness or Imprecision
  Incompatible with the Object and Purpose of   
  the Treaty
 Sweden Invocation of Domestic Law
 Germany Invocation of Domestic Law
 Finland Too Wide 
  Vagueness or Imprecision
  Incompatible with the Object and Purpose of   
  the Treaty
 Netherlands Invocation of Domestic Law
 Ireland Incompatible with the Object and Purpose of   
  the Treaty
 Portugal Invocation of Domestic Law
Singapore Portugal Invocation of Domestic Law
 Finland Vagueness or Imprecision
  Invocation of Domestic Law
  Incompatible with the Object and Purpose of   
  the Treaty
 Belgium Invocation of Domestic Law
 Germany Invocation of Domestic Law
 Italy Invocation of Domestic Law
 Netherlands Invocation of Domestic Law
 Norway Incompatible with the Object and Purpose of   
  the Treaty
Thailand Ireland Invocation of Domestic Law
 Sweden No Clarification for the Finding of    
  Incompatibility
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132. Initial	Reports	of	States	Parties:	Brunei	Darussalam, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/61/Add.5 (20 Dec. 
2001). The précis of the state’s discussions with the Committee is taken from the record 
of proceedings in Press	 Release:	UN	Committee	 on	 the	Rights	 of	 the	Child	Reviews	
Initial	Report	of	Brunei	Darussalam (25 Sept. 2003).
Of the ten states objecting to Brunei-Darussalam’s reservations, three 
found them clearly incompatible with the object and purpose of the CRC, 
and six used the more delicate form of expressing doubts about its com-
mitment to the object and purpose of the Convention. Two states, Finland 
and Denmark, severed the reservations. None of the nine objecting states 
declared there to be no treaty relations with Brunei Darussalam.
Ten states objected to Malaysia’s reservations. Five did so in unequivo-
cal terms, such as Finland declaring that they “clearly” were incompatible 
with the object and purpose of CRC. Four states expressed doubts about 
Malaysia’s commitment to the treaty. Three of the objecting states severed 
the reservation: Belgium, Denmark, and Finland. Denmark pointed out that 
the reservations covered multiple provisions, including central provisions 
of the treaty, as did Finland. None of the nine objecting states opposed the 
entry into force of the treaty with Malaysia.
Seven states objected to Singapore’s reservations (including its two decla-
rations). Three of these found the reservations without a doubt incompatible, 
and four caused the objecting states to express doubts about Singapore’s 
commitment to the object and purpose of the CRC. The Netherlands pointed 
out that the second of Singapore’s declarations was impermissible for im-
pacting on the fundamental nature of the rights protected in Article 19 and 
37. Finland, Belgium, and Norway severed the reservations, and no state 
opposed the entry into force of the treaty with Singapore.
Two states objected to Thailand’s reservations. Ireland objected on the 
grounds that it created doubts about that state’s commitment to the object 
and purpose of the treaty. Sweden found the reservations to Articles 9(2), 
15(3), and 16 to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the CRC. 
Neither state severed the reservations and none opposed the entry into force 
with Thailand. None of the reserving states responded to the objections.
3.		ASEAN	States,	their	Reservations	and	the	Committee	on	the	Right	
of	the	Child
Brunei-Darussalam appeared before the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child on 25 September 2003 to present its initial report.132 The Committee’s 
country rapporteur expressed concern about the two types of reservations that 
the state had entered: the general reservations in relation to its constitution 
and Islamic principles and the specific reservations to articles pertaining to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, protection of a child without 
a family, and adoption. The state responded that since Islam was the main 
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principle on which the country was based, the reservations were made in 
accordance with Islamic doctrine as well as its constitution. However, it was 
stressed Brunei-Darussalam had not failed in its efforts to promote and protect 
the rights of children. In its Concluding Observations of 27 October 2003, 
the Committee expressed its deep concern “that the broad and imprecise 
nature of the state party’s general reservation potentially negates many of the 
provisions and principles of the Convention as to its compatibility with the 
object and purpose of the Convention, as well as the overall implementa-
tion of the Convention.”133 It strongly recommended re-examination of the 
reservations with a view to withdrawing them.
Malaysia presented its initial report to the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child on 25 January 2007.134 The state was forthcoming about its inability 
to fulfill all of its obligations under the Convention, but stressed that this did 
not mean the will was not there. Implementation was proving more difficult 
than simply amending laws. Questioned about its non-ratification of other 
human rights conventions, Malaysia’s Head of Delegation explained that 
its CRC ratification had required a huge undertaking to conform with the 
ensuing treaty obligations, involving amending its legislation. The state had 
not been able to complete it and that looked bad. He stressed that it was 
not lack of interest or lack of concern about the issues raised in the various 
human rights conventions, but the difficulty of preparing Malaysian law to 
be in conformity with them. On the withdrawal of the reservations to the 
CRC, Malaysia reported that it had imposed certain internal timeframes for 
that to happen, but did not want to share them for fear of promising what 
could not be delivered. In relation to the reservation to Article 37, Malaysia 
was already committed to withdrawal as caning or whipping was unaccept-
able, against the CRC and there were no problems foreseen with amending 
the Child Act to reflect that. In its concluding observations of 2 February 
2007, the Committee noted with appreciation the efforts to review some of 
its reservations and emphasized that:
[M]any of the reservations are, with regard to the progress made in the adapta-
tion of the legislation to the requirements of the Convention and in the light 
of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World 
Conference on Human Rights of 1993, not necessary as also concluded at the 
Forum on Malaysia’s reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
which was held on 25 September 2005.135 
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It called on Malaysia to expedite its review with a view to withdrawing all 
of the reservations. It also encouraged Malaysia to ratify or accede to the 
other major international human rights instruments.
Singapore’s initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
was considered on 26 September 2003.136 Singapore declared itself strongly 
in support of the spirit and objectives of the Convention, and shared the 
universal vision of a world that was safe, secure, and nurturing of children. 
Her accession to the CRC signaled its commitment to uphold the rights and 
best interests of children in the country. Singapore sought to develop in its 
children a sense of their own social responsibility, as it believed that rights 
should be accompanied by civil responsibility. Its reservations and declara-
tions were made in areas where they were required by the country’s particular 
national circumstances and social context. There was a belief that the rights 
and best interests of the child were best served if the nation, community, and 
family continued to grow in strength. However, Singapore stressed that its 
reservations in no way impeded vigorous and committed action on the part 
of the government and society to ensure that the spirit and substance of the 
CRC was upheld and the best interests of the child were upheld. Singapore 
insisted that its reservations and declarations were entered in accordance 
with the special circumstances of its society. Singapore believed that it could 
only accept the obligations that it could fulfill. Singapore considered that a 
child’s rights as defined in the Convention, in particular the rights defined 
in Articles 12 to 17, should be exercised with respect for the authority of 
parents, schools, and other persons who were entrusted with the care of 
the child and in the best interests of the child. Concerning the reservations, 
the constitution and the laws of Singapore provided adequate protection 
and fundamental rights and freedoms in the best interests of the child. 
Accession to the Convention did not imply the acceptance of obligations 
going beyond the limits prescribed by the constitution or the acceptance 
of any obligation to introduce any right beyond those prescribed under the 
constitution. Singapore would only accept obligations that it could abide 
by and it could only accept what it could really accomplish. It could not 
promise to review its position on the reservations and declarations but would 
continue to do what it could. On 27 October 2003, the CRC Committee 
made its Concluding Observations, expressing concern about Singapore’s 
declarations and reservations, and calling for their withdrawal in light of the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.137
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On 24 January 2006, the Committee on the Rights of the Child examined 
Thailand’s second periodic report.138 The Committee raised the contradictions 
in the government’s attitude. On the one hand, it was undergoing reforms 
and was committed to children’s rights, but on the other hand it still retained 
reservations to the CRC. The delegation explained that many discussions 
had been held favoring the withdrawal of the two reservations, and it was 
now a question of working together with the authorities responsible for the 
decision making. Various improvements had been done to carry through 
the spirit of Articles 7 and 22. A new policy was already in the process of 
implementation to register everyone regardless of whether they were living 
in Thailand legally or illegally. In its Concluding Observations, the Com-
mittee noted that progress had been made but regretted the maintenance 
of reservations. The Committee also pointed out that Thailand had ratified 
Articles 7 and 22 of the ICCPR without having made any such reservations. 
Thailand was recommended to withdraw the reservations in line with the 
Vienna Declaration and Plan of Action of the World Conference.139
d. optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
The Optional Protocol was adopted by Resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 
2000 at the fifty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
It seeks to regulate more stringently the participation of children in armed 
conflict, specifically raising the minimum age to eighteen years. 
There are 122 states that are party to it, including five ASEAN members: 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Indonesia and 
Singapore have signed but not ratified. None of the ASEAN states that are party 
have entered reservations, although Cambodia, Lao PDR, and the Philippines 
have made declarations. No objections were lodged against them.
E. optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography
The Optional Protocol was adopted by Resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 
2000 at the fifty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
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It seeks to criminalize the sale of children, child prostitution, and child 
pornography.
There are 117 parties to this Optional Protocol, including Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam. Indonesia is only a signatory. Article 5, 
dealing with extradition for crimes under the Optional Protocol, attracted 
reservations from Lao PDR (Article 5(2)) and Vietnam (Article 5 (1) to (4)). 
There were no objections. 
V. ASSESSMENT oF THE IMPACT oF ASEAN STATES RESERVATIoNS 
To HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES ANd THE ASEAN CoMMISSIoN oN 
WoMEN ANd CHILdREN
A. No Common Standard
All of the ASEAN states are party to CEDAW and CERD, but their cherry-
picking of legal obligations through use (misuse) of the permissive reserva-
tions regime has created a complex patchwork of different undertakings. 
The foregoing section revealed that there is no common standard binding 
all ASEAN states in the matter of women and children. One cannot even 
identify a lowest common denominator, a minimum core within the minimum 
core of rights laid down in the conventions, because even those articles that 
have not been specifically reserved against are potentially caught under the 
sweeping “catch-all” reservations by certain states. 
The waters are muddied further by the unresolved issues surrounding 
the many ASEAN state reservations that have been declared by other states 
or the treaty monitoring bodies as being incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the treaty. Some ASEAN states, such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Lao 
PDR, the Philippines, and Myanmar, are bound by the two conventions in 
their entirety. Finally, some states are also party to optional protocols to 
CEDAW and CRC, others are not. 
b. Are States that Enter Reservations any Worse or better than States 
that do not?
There are many ways of measuring human rights compliance.140 In 1998, 
the CEDAW Committee suggested that reservations to any human rights 
treaty “clearly indicate the degree of commitment of the reserving state to 
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full compliance with the particular treaty.”141 Based on what has emerged 
in the periodic state reports and dialogue with the committees culminating 
in the Concluding Observations (admittedly a minimalist form of monitor-
ing and ensuring compliance), one cannot conclude that states that have 
entered no reservations, or that have removed existing ones, are doing any 
better in promoting and protecting human rights than those that have entered 
extensive reservation. One cannot say that Myanmar and Cambodia, with no 
reservations to either treaty, are doing better on the rights of their women and 
children than Singapore, with its very significant reservations. As observed 
in relation to CEDAW, Thailand (which has progressively pruned down its 
reservations over the years) was accused by a committee member of taking 
its treaty obligations lightly. If anything, the detailed explanations put forward 
by states with reservations, such as Malaysia and Singapore, suggest that 
they are taking their treaty obligations seriously. On the other hand, it may 
of course be that it is the opportunity to present the most positive picture 
of the state that is being taken seriously. The point may need to be made 
that the size of the delegation that is sent to Geneva does not equal com-
mitment to human rights. Untimely reports do not bode well, but there may 
be a variety of understandable reasons for late submissions. Finally, buying 
into United Nations human rights jargon of benchmarks, tools, action plans, 
building blocks, and roadmaps does not equal compliance. 
Some of the ASEAN states with reservations, such as Thailand and Ma-
laysia, do indicate that they are making efforts to remove their reservations. 
Singapore is not making any concessions whatsoever; its periodic reports 
consist of arguments about how what is done in Singapore on the basis of 
the existing system is fully consistent with the Convention. Singapore will 
only accept obligations which it can fulfill, it has told the CRC Committee. 
Accession did not imply acceptance of any obligations going beyond its 
constitution. Using the periodic reporting exercise as a yardstick, it is hard to 
see that the non-reserving states (Philippines, Cambodia, Myanmar, Indone-
sia, and Vietnam), are doing better on protecting women and children than 
Brunei Darussalam, Thailand, Singapore, or Malaysia with their reservations. 
A very different survey than this study is required to establish whether the 
protection of women and children has actually improved since these states 
became party to the treaties. Oona Hathaway’s research found that:
Although the ratings of human rights practices of countries that have ratified 
international human rights treaties are generally better than those that have not, 
noncompliance with treaty obligations appears to be common. More paradoxi-
cally, when I take into account the influence of a range of other factors that affect 
countries’ practices, I find that treaty ratification is not infrequently associated 
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with worse human rights ratings than otherwise expected. I do, however, find 
evidence suggesting that ratification of human rights treaties by fully democratic 
nations is associated with better human right practices.142
C. Is ASEAN still a bastion of relativism?
The data suggest not anymore. Only four of the ten ASEAN states still hold 
on to some form of a relativism justification for not meeting the demands of 
international human rights law: Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and 
Thailand. Adding to the impression that the opposition to human rights on 
relativist grounds in ASEAN has become marginal, is the fact that one-time 
Asian values champion Indonesia, has now withdrawn all its reservations 
to CEDAW and CERD. 
Within the four “relativists” there is considerable distance; this is no 
monolithic block. The reservations are not about ASEAN values or Asian 
values, but instead about the particular circumstances in the country and its 
society. Thailand has been progressively removing its reservations to CEDAW 
(seven out of nine reservations were removed over sixteen years), but says 
it has had difficulty with ordinary citizens and prevailing attitudes about 
the role of women in Thai society. It appears to be struggling to maintain 
the right balance of its culture and traditions, with international norms on 
the rights of women. Singapore’s arguments suggest that its society is strad-
dling a sensitive yet correctly calibrated economic, cultural, socioeconomic 
balance that will not withstand tampering, whether in relation to women 
or children. Singapore claims to share the same objectives as other states 
parties, but its society has certain views on bringing up children, and the 
role of parents and society in the welfare and best interests of the child. 
Singapore’s reports and explanations show no willingness to review or 
reconsider the situation. Brunei Darussalam also shows no signs of move-
ment on its reservations to the two treaties. Malaysia asserted to the CEDAW 
Committee that it had made reservations because parts of the convention 
were not compatible with its domestic law, yet was reviewing the situation 
with respect to some of those reservations. On the other hand, it explained 
to the CRC Committee the difficulties in preparing Malaysian law to be in 
conformity with the CRC, assuring them that it was not about lack of will. 
The Head of Delegation assured the CRC Committee in January 2007 that 
internal deadlines had been set for removal of the reservations.
If there is a link, it is between the three states that raise Islamic law—Bru-
nei Darussalam, Malaysia, and Singapore raising the situation of minority 
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Muslim population. This seems to be a line which none of these states is 
prepared to cross.
d.  What about customary international law and obligations erga  
omnes?
Malaysia’s reservation to the non-discrimination provision of CEDAW raises 
interesting issues concerning peremptory norms and obligations erga	omnes. 
Malaysia reads womens’ property rights in CEDAW as subject to Shariah 
law on the division of inherited property. It reads equality in employment as 
being subject to certain public offices like the Mufti Shariah Court Judges, 
and the Imam which is in accordance with the provisions of the Islamic 
Shariah law. The right to marriage and family life is subject to Shariah law 
and the laws of Malaysia, under which the age limit for marriage for women 
is sixteen and men is eighteen. This, it will be recalled, was declared by 
objecting states and the Committee as being incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the Convention.
To date, it is only racial	discrimination that is recognized as being a 
norm imposing obligations erga	omnes.143 Is this to be resolved by way of 
reference to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, which deals with treaties 
conflicting with peremptory norms of international law, not reservations? 
The Human Rights Committee has made its position clear that reservations 
that offend provisions which reflect peremptory norms, or even customary 
norms, are incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty (General 
Comment No. 24).144 But for the ILC’s Special Rapporteur, reservations to cus-
tomary norms are not invariably contrary to a treaty’s object and purpose.145 
However, he argues that in “the absence of clear justification, therefore, it 
is impossible for the other contracting parties or for monitoring bodies to 
verify the validity of the reservation, and it is best to adopt the principle that 
any reservation to a provision which formulates a rule of jus cogens is null 
and void ipso facto.”146 For him, Article 53 of the Vienna Convention applies 
not only to treaty relations but to “all legal acts, including unilateral acts.”147 
He is now proposing a guideline providing that states “may not formulate 
a reservation to a treaty provision which sets forth a peremptory norm of 
general international law.”148 Professor Hampson also takes the view that no 
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reservation to a norm of jus	cogens character would be valid, unlike with 
customary norms.149
The next question is, is there a rule of international law dealing with 
discrimination per se? The prohibition against discrimination on prohibited 
grounds (race, sex, or religion) can be traced through treaties such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Articles 2, 26), the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (Article 
2(3)), International Labour Organisation Convention No. 111 Concern-
ing Discrimination in respect of Employment and Occupation (1958), the 
UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education (1966) European 
Convention on Human Rights (Article 13) and American Convention on 
Human Rights back to the UN Charter (Articles 1(2) and 13(1)), and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 1,2, 4,7) which is of course 
not binding in itself. Non-discrimination as to race, sex, language, or reli-
gion in the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is one of the objectives of the United Nations, and 
as such, under Article 103 of the Charter, will take precedence to other 
international obligations (arguably including those limitations set down 
in reservations). Non-discrimination clauses listing prohibited grounds are 
included in many national constitutions, such as Article 12 of Singapore’s 
Constitution and Article 39 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law incorporating the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Many countries have 
laws prohibiting discrimination (albeit on their own terms). In their practice, 
states will rarely acknowledge unlawful differential treatment (discrimination) 
in their jurisdiction, but will seek to justify offending conduct in terms of 
lawful differential treatment. This strongly suggests that the norms protecting 
equality, and prohibiting discrimination on certain grounds in addition to 
race, are customary, but whether they have entered the realm of obligations 
erga	omnes is debatable. 
The data suggests that there are three areas where it is possible that new 
customary rules on reservations may be developing (lex	in	statu	nascendi). 
For the avoidance of doubt, this study does not claim there is the neces-
sary degree of consistent and uniform state practice and opinio	juris that is 
needed to prove the existence of new rules of customary international law; 
there are however signs of possible evolution in that direction in the three 
areas. The first relates to a possible regional custom evolving among the 
Nordic states (and shared by other non-Nordic states): Finland, Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden, to object to reservations to human rights treaties that 
are, or appear to be, contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. Some 
of these states are inclined, despite the futility of the gesture, to declare such 
reservations severed in order in an attempt to make the point that the state 
making invalid reservations cannot benefit from them. 
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The second area of interest relates to reservations that subject inter-
national obligations to the constitution or domestic law. As this study has 
shown, this is a common form of reservation. It is very often met by the 
objection that it is not permissible to raise domestic law as an excuse for 
non-compliance with international undertakings. Both the CEDAW and 
CRC Committees, as well as objecting states, have commented on it in 
light of Article 27 of the Vienna Convention. But as has been rightly argued 
by Schabas, Article 27 has nothing to do with reservations, but to do with 
performance of treaty obligations.150 It comes in Part III of The Vienna Con-
vention on Observance, Application and Interpretation of Treaties, in Section 
7. Observance of treaties only comes into play once the extent of the state’s 
obligations have been determined, i.e., once the issue of reservations has 
been addressed and resolved. One cannot just “transpose” the rule as was 
suggested in discussions at the International Law Commission.151 Yet a wide 
range of states are persistently making the claim that it is not permissible to 
use domestic law as an excuse for not meeting international obligations in 
relation to reservations. This is something worth watching; it may signal a 
change in the customary rule. 
The third area of interest relates to objections to the generality or 
vagueness of a reservation. The objections in this area seem to draw from 
the practice of the European Court of Human Rights and Article 64 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits reservations of 
a general nature. It should be noted that Professor Pellet is proposing a 
Guideline 3.1.7, whereby reservations worded in vague, general language 
which does not allow its scope to be determined is incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the treaty.152
E. Locating the ASEAN Reservations to CEdAW and CRC in the wider 
doctrinal disputes
The examples examined in this article cut to the heart of the contemporary 
dispute over reservations to human rights treaties. This article has examined 
a number of states that have sought to limit their treaty obligations. Under 
current international law, they may do so, as it is a fundamental principle 
that states cannot be bound to what they did not consent to. Both CEDAW 
and CRC permit reservations with the usual limitations, but do not require 
that acceptance by other states is the condition for permissibility.
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Apart from Thailand’s CRC reservation, each ASEAN state entering reser-
vations to CRC or CEDAW drew objections from at least one other state,153 
because of the compatibility of that reservation with the object and purpose 
of the treaty itself. In three cases: Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and Thailand 
and their CEDAW reservations, every objecting state found the reservations 
to be clearly incompatible. Other reservations drew a mix of outright and 
nuanced denunciation. The reasons given for objecting are not just based 
on incompatibility with object and purpose. They include the width of the 
reservation, vagueness, or imprecision and invocation of domestic law. In 
addition, the two Committees have made their views clear. Whatever the 
legal consequences, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand 
have been found to have entered reservations that run contrary to the object 
and purpose of CEDAW and CRC. 
But what about the other states that stayed silent? Given the signs of a 
concerted practice among some of the Nordic states and some other European 
states such as Ireland and Portugal, what of others like the United Kingdom 
and France? Some states, such as the US, are not regular objectors (which 
may have something to do with the fact that it is a regular maker-of-reser-
vations). In 1989, the Rosalyn Higgins suggested that silence in the face of 
incompatible reservations may amount to collusion.154 Another view is that 
it is more that states just cannot be bothered to do so if there is no need to 
object, or no benefit is to be derived from lodging an objection.155 In the 
absence of reasoned explanation in each situation, one can but speculate.
The human rights treaty and Vienna Convention based regimes, with no 
permanent independent mechanism expressly authorized to appraise and act 
upon reservations, have resulted in a vacuum. As noted, every single state 
objecting to the reservations of Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and Thailand 
to CEDAW did so on unequivocal grounds of incompatibility with the object 
and purpose of the treaty. But what could they do beyond the empty politi-
cal gesture of lodging an objection? Saying that the treaty does not apply at 
all is of no use in human rights treaties, where one wants maximum treaty 
participation and the objecting state has no interest in using the reserva-
tion itself. The only option of the reserving states to maintain participation 
and preserve integrity of the treaty is to sever the reservation. This in itself 
is an act of uncertain value given that severance is not provided for in the 
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treaty or the Vienna Convention regime and thus may have no practical ef-
fect. It will be recalled that the treaty’s design allows not for severance of 
the reservation, but maintenance of the reservation despite the objections. 
The reality is that the reserving states are continuing to benefit from their 
reservations: the practice of Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand, including the responses of the committees, make it clear that they 
continue to be parties to the treaties on the terms that they have set and that 
the objections of other states are irrelevant. 
There are no special rules for human rights treaties. Some states, such 
as Singapore, make it clear that joining on their terms is the price of par-
ticipation in the treaty. Others, such as Thailand and Malaysia, indicate that 
they are working towards removal of some or all of the reservations. None 
of the states with controversial reservations challenge objections or com-
plaints from the treaty bodies that their reservations go right to the heart of 
the treaty. Instead, they focus on justifying the necessity for such limitations. 
The ASEAN states’ reservations to the normative provisions of CEDAW and 
CRC have been to specific provisions or are general in nature. In the latter 
case, the state explains the limitation of its treaty obligation on one or sev-
eral grounds: the constitution, national laws, Islam/religion, state/national 
policies, or existing socio-political conditions in the country. 
The objections thereto allege these reservations to be either vague or 
imprecise, improperly raise internal laws, too wide, or simply incompat-
ible with the object and purpose of the treaty. To be precise, some of the 
objections are ultimately subsumed under a finding of incompatibility. But 
overall, the practice is evidence that compatibility is not the only standard 
for objecting to reservations. The objecting states also made the following 
observations about the ASEAN reservations:
1.  Such reservations undermined the basis of international human rights 
treaties.
2. Such reservations undermined the basis of international treaty law.
3.  They expressed doubts about the state’s commitment to fulfill its treaty 
obligations.
4.  It is in the common interest of states that are party to a treaty to make 
the necessary legislative changes and to fulfill the object and purpose 
of the treaty.
5.  It is in the common interest of states that treaties to which they have 
chosen to be parties should be respected as to the object and pur-
pose.
From this small study alone, we see layers of bilateral relationship that 
emerge from the reservations of ASEAN states to CEDAW and CRC, and the 
objections thereto. There are some situations where the Vienna Convention 
provides guidance: reservations to which states that have not taken the op-
portunity to object to (under Article 20(5), silence will be deemed to be 
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acceptance of the reservation, which then applies in full between the par-
ties) and where states that have objected on compatibility grounds but not 
objected to the treaty entering into force between them or have expressly 
stated that the treaty does enter into force between them (under Article 
20(4)(b) and 21(3), in the absence of definite expression of an intention that 
the treaty does not enter into force, it will do so, but without the provision to 
which the reservation attaches). Where a state has simply expressed doubts 
about the compatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the 
treaty, the reservation will apply in its bilateral relationship with that other 
state. The legal relationship is unclear where states that have not objected 
because they believe it unnecessary to object to invalid reservations, and 
where states that have objected on compatibility grounds have severed the 
reservation or stated that the treaty applies in full between themselves and 
the reserving state. As far as these reserving ASEAN states are concerned, 
the factual reality is that their reservations apply no matter what the de	jure 
situation may be. 
From a formal legal perspective, the effect of the ASEAN reservations 
and objections depends on one’s doctrinal perspective. Quarrelling about 
doctrine may be fun for some academics, but it is hardly satisfactory for the 
states and practitioners who usually just want to know what the law is and to 
get on with applying it. Even the ILC is unable to take a position. Professor 
Pellet asserts that this ongoing and perhaps insoluble doctrinal quarrel reveals 
ambiguities and uncertainties about reservations that the Vienna Convention 
cannot resolve.156 If one follows the permissibility school, these reservations 
are invalid, null and void from the start and the objection of a state would 
simply be confirmatory. Following the opposability school, a reservation that 
is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty is only invalid if 
another state objects on that ground. Under the Vienna Convention system, 
even such an objecting state would have to repudiate treaty relations for 
the reservations to be void of legal effect. And, even then, it would only 
be on a bilateral basis. At the end of the day, in practical terms, no matter 
what doctrinal position one follows, it is quite clear that these ASEAN states, 
specifically Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, remain 
parties to the treaties that they have filed controversial reservations to. They 
regard their international obligations as subject to their reservations, most 
forcefully expressed by Singapore. All are engaged as parties to the two 
treaties, for example attending the meetings of states parties to the two trea-
ties, reporting and engaging in dialogue with the treaty bodies with a view 
to attaining the objects and purposes of the treaties. The two treaty bodies 
express concern about the reservations and call on the states to withdraw 
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them, but do not challenge the state’s proceeding on the basis that its treaty 
obligations are subject to its reservation. Not one of the objecting states 
treats them as non-party to the treaty, in spite of the strength of some of the 
objections to the reservations on grounds of incompatibility. To sum up, in 
the world of CEDAW and the CRC, a limitation that is incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the treaty is in fact treated as a reservation.157 The 
reserving state is allowed to rely on that reservation; objections from other 
states play only a symbolic role. 
ASEAN states, not surprisingly in light of their common policy on 
non-intervention, do not enter objections or make comments about the 
reservations of other states. The European states are much more active, and 
appear to be behaving in a concerted manner. From this study, there is 
not a common EU position, but it is clear that the same states consistently 
make their objections on the same issues, at least in relation to ASEAN 
states. Severance of the reservation by an objecting state is a feature of the 
objections entered by some Nordic states, notably Finland and Denmark, 
suggesting a possible regional custom in evolution.158 As noted earlier, this 
is probably as far as states can go in the human rights system, where reci-
procity makes no sense. None of the objecting states felt strongly enough 
to declare the non-existence of treaty relations. This is not surprising, given 
that human rights treaties are not about the personal interests of states but 
go towards protection of the human person within the jurisdiction of each 
party. As such, the objecting state has no personal interest in declaring there 
to be no treaty relations between itself and the reserving state. Its wider 
policy interest is to ensure that states, such as those in ASEAN who have 
been hesitant about participation in human rights treaties, do actually take 
part. We do not have any responses from reserving states; they continue to 
maintain the reservations until, as in the cases of Thailand and Indonesia, 
they are able to withdraw them. 
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VI. WITHER THE ASEAN CoMMISSIoN oN WoMEN ANd CHILdREN?
We seem to be in the midst of what international relations theorists call a 
norms cascade in ASEAN—support for a particular norm gathers slowly until 
it reaches a threshold or “tipping” point, after which the adoption by other 
states in the region of that norm occurs more rapidly and leads to a “cas-
cade” effect.159 There has certainly been a shift in the perceived legitimacy 
of the international norms protecting the human person. But it is important 
to distinguish between norm-recognition with norm-compliance. ASEAN 
states may now have begun taking an active part in the life of human rights 
treaties such as CEDAW and CRC, but their compliance records show there 
is a long way to go before the treaty obligations are met. ASEAN states do 
not yet appear to be willing to submit to a truly independent and powerful 
supervisory human rights body in their own backyard. After all, only one 
state—the Philippines—has consented to an individual petition mechanism 
offered by a treaty system. 
Even if there is a norms cascade, the challenges for those working on 
human rights in ASEAN continue to be very significant. Aspirations for a bet-
ter future for human rights in ASEAN states must be tempered with realism. 
The possibility of a human rights mechanism began to be heard in ASEAN 
discourse as long ago as 1993. Yet in 2007, the discussions remain aspira-
tional. ASEAN still speaks of the possibility of such a mechanism, although 
it is now stamped with the seal of respectability by being officially recom-
mended by the Eminent Persons Group. The Vientiane Action Plan has taken 
up the notion of a Commission on Women and Children. At the moment, 
it does not look like the ASEAN Charter itself will entrench a women and 
children’s commission or any other human rights mechanism. But we must 
remember that a graduated approach in regional systems is not unusual. 
When states in the Americas created the Organization of American States 
(OAS) in 1948, they did so via the Charter of the Organization of American 
States. This charter had a significant focus on human rights: democracy, 
economic rights, the right to education, and equality, complementing the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man which all the states 
also signed. The OAS Charter also established the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights as the principal human rights institution within the 
organization. It was only in 1978 that the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights came into being with the entry into force of the 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights. The Declaration continues to be the standard 
by which states that are not party to the American Convention on Human 
Rights are bound. Today’s African Union is the successor of the Organiza-
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tion of African Unity (OAU), established on 25 May 1963. It was almost 
twenty years later that the OAU adopted the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights in 1981 as its primary human rights instrument. And this 
came with significant “clawback clauses” for the state at the expense of the 
rights protected. The Charter led to the establishment of the African Human 
Rights Commission, charged with ensuring the promotion and protection 
of human and peoples’ rights in Africa. The African Union succeeded the 
OAU and the African Economic Community in 2001. Its objectives include 
the promotion and protection of “human and peoples’ rights in accordance 
with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant 
human rights instruments.” The African Court on Human and Peoples Rights 
was only established twelve years after the entry into force of the African 
Charter, and its judges appointed in 2006. Implementation of human rights 
in a new ASEAN may well follow such a leisurely pace; this is a debate that 
has after all, been running since 1993.
Lowest common denominators are lethal for the integrity of normative 
instruments on human rights. Even so, it has been demonstrated in this article 
that the general cross-cutting reservations coming on top of the article-spe-
cific ones, result in the absence of a common standard of obligation among 
ASEAN states. Even if one were to compromise, one cannot compromise 
when there is no discernable bottom line. Furthermore, designing an ASEAN 
commission drawing in states that have limited their treaty obligations 
through invalid reservations, will be creating a “value minus” institution 
(“value plus” being a buzzword used in ASEAN NGO circles).160 Bending 
over backwards to accommodate them would be akin to a renegotiation of 
the terms of CERD and CEDAW. If such a weak mechanism went ahead, 
what is to be done about those controversial reservations? It is worth noting 
that no CEDAW based referrals to the International Court of Justice have 
ever been made; in any event, treaty-based dispute resolution clauses are 
not popular among ASEAN states (although five of them have now turned to 
international courts for settlement of their disputes).161 Given their sensitiv-
ity on sovereignty, it is unlikely that these states will consent to a powerful 
and independent Commission on Women and Children with authority not 
just to comment on their reservations, but also to make binding findings on 
the effect thereof. 
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It would be a waste of time to create a commission to function as a 
talk-shop, but whether in the current political climate there can be anything 
as intrusive as judicial scrutiny or individual petition is questionable, not 
just from the political will angle but on grounds of effectiveness. A number 
of ASEAN states are using the International Court of Justice to settle their 
disputes, but their preference is to be non-confrontational and cooperate 
with each other. This feeds into the well-established ASEAN policy of non-
interference. 
From a legal and policy perspective, it is clear that any sacrifice of the 
integrity of CEDAW and CRC in the pursuit of ASEAN’s first, and hopefully 
not only, human rights mechanism or a sui	generis ASEAN perspective on 
women and children (which will be a repackaging of the passé Asian Values 
position), needs to be strenuously resisted. In light of the issues examined 
in this article, if CEDAW and CERD are not to be watered down, there can 
only be one option for a Commission on Women and Children based on a 
Charter or other foundational document setting out the legal framework—it 
must have as its minimum standard the entire normative content of CEDAW 
and CRC, with no option for reservations.162 
This would mean only the six ASEAN states (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao 
PDR, Philippines, Myanmar, and Vietnam) that have unfettered participation 
in those treaties should participate in an ASEAN Commission for Women 
and Children.163 The others should only be able to join when they have 
aligned their treaty obligations with the six, but obviously they will need 
to be given some incentive to do so. However, the issues are not so clear 
cut. For example, if the lives of Singapore’s women and children are indeed 
already so fulfilled, why would they need to take part in an ASEAN Com-
mission on Women and Children on top of regularly explaining themselves 
to the committees in Geneva? Singapore is one of those states that can, 
it seems, manage on its own, and it may well see no incentive to join a 
regional commission. For other countries, an incentive would be concrete 
and substantial assistance in helping states meet their treaty based obliga-
tions, and helping those already doing well to go further. The CEDAW and 
CRC periodic reporting processes clearly reveal that the six non-reserving 
ASEAN states continue to need enormous assistance in meeting their pacta	
sunt	servanda obligations. The gaps that exist between reporting, monitoring, 
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and implementation need to be plugged. This is a clear role for the Com-
mission, and it also relates directly to greater regional cooperation in human 
rights and the realization of an ASEAN identity. Anticipating and resisting 
use of a Commission on Women and Children as an excuse—whether for 
not establishing a wider regional mechanism, not removing reservations, 
or not becoming party to core human rights treaties or optional protocols 
allowing for individual petition—is also immensely important. Ensuring the 
coherent whole in line with the other principal human rights treaties and 
preventing duplication of efforts with the existing treaty-monitoring bodies 
and the national human rights commissions (Philippines, Thailand, Indo-
nesia, and Malaysia have commissions that do significant work on women 
and children; Cambodia is working towards establishing one) are just some 
of the many other matters that will need to be carefully considered in the 
design of the commission. An ASEAN commission could certainly be given 
a lead role in the drafting and implementation of treaties that crystallize 
cooperation in, for example, trafficking of women and children, sex tourism, 
child prostitution, pornography, and adoption etc. Such activities are of the 
type that can certainly supplement CEDAW and CERD. The ultimate goal 
is of course to enhance the protection of the human person in ASEAN by 
entrenching human rights. But to duplicate efforts, make unrealistic demands 
or overburden states would be counterproductive in that slow step-by-step 
journey that ASEAN states are now making in the world of human rights.
